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Productive Unionism
Matthew Dimick*
Do labor unions have a future? This Article considers the role and
importance of labor union structures to the future of labor unions, in
particular the degree of centralization in collective bargaining.
Centralization refers primarily to the level at which collective bargaining
takes place: whether at the workplace, firm, industry, or national level. The
Article examines the historical origins of different structures of bargaining
in the United States and Europe, the important implications that
centralization has for economic productivity, and the ways that various labor
law rules reinforce or reflect different bargaining structures. Most critically,
the Article contends that greater centralization of collective bargaining
entails a broader, more “universal” representation of worker interests, has
a stronger impact on unions’ ability to lower income inequality, and, through
its positive effects on economic productivity, reduces employer opposition to
unionization in the long run. Although centralized bargaining is a mediumto long-term goal for the American labor movement, the Article proposes
ways that unions can change their own organizational structures, bargaining
objectives, and organizing tactics to position themselves for future changes in
bargaining structure and to avoid the pitfalls of the decentralized bargaining
structures of the past.
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INTRODUCTION
Do labor unions have a future? This Article contends that if they are to have
one, then unions must adjust to some fundamental economic imperatives. Critics
of labor unions have long argued that labor unions advance the interests of
particular workers at the expense of employers and the larger economy—even at
the expense of other nonunion workers. The critique states that both in how they
bargain and in what they bargain over, unions erect multiple obstacles to economic
change and growth. In this Article, I concede that the critics are correct—to a point.
The critics err because the issue is not whether labor unionism by itself is good or
bad. Rather, it is the specific form of organization and bargaining that unions adopt
that is decisive for their impact on economic performance.
The problem is fundamentally one of union structure, and in particular the
degree of union and collective bargaining centralization. By centralization, I refer
primarily to the level at which collective bargaining takes place. In the United States,
most collective bargaining takes place at the workplace level and, in some cases, at
the firm level.1 In contrast, in Europe, collective bargaining tends to be more
centralized, taking place at a higher level, typically at the industry or sector level.2 It
is possible for bargaining to become even more centralized, with bargaining

1. See Michael Wallerstein & Bruce Western, Unions in Decline? What Has Changed and Why, 2000
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 355, 364, 366 tbl.3 (2000).
2. Lucio Baccaro, Centralized Collective Bargaining and the Problem of “Compliance”: Lessons from the
Italian Experience, 53 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 579, 580 (2000).
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embracing all industries at a national level, as has occurred in some countries over
quite significant periods of time.3
The level of centralization has multiple and diverse implications for how
unions affect economic output, productivity, efficiency, and growth. As will be
elaborated in the Article, the level of centralization influences the nature and content
of bargaining subjects in ways that have critical consequences for economic
productivity. Union structures also affect firms’ incentives to invest in productive
capital, as well as how much training firms provide to their workers. Centralization
even has potentially positive macroeconomic implications for inflation and
unemployment. However, and perhaps most critically, it is through these economic
consequences that centralization affects whether and how much employers oppose
unionization. Thus, one could legitimately object that the goals of unionization are
not economic and instrumental (for instance, to enhance productivity) but rather
are normative (for instance, to ensure a fair division of the economic pie). But, in
my argument, these two objectives are inseparable: unions can only robustly sustain
their normative and distributive mission if they can solve the problem of employer
opposition. And employer opposition can best be reduced (if never completely
eliminated) by adopting structures of bargaining and organization that enhance,
rather than detract, from the demands of economic productivity. Ultimately,
therefore, the level of centralization also determines how effective unions are in
achieving their fundamental objective of a just and fair economy. To put this more
critically, not only do the prevailing structures of U.S. unions induce wasteful
economic harm and vociferous employer opposition, but they also fundamentally
fail to “deliver the goods” to the vast majority of workers. Fortunately, as this Article
contends, unions really can have their cake and eat it too. Indeed, empirically, the
more centralized wage bargaining is, the more collective bargaining reduces income
inequality.
Nevertheless, although greater centralization of wage bargaining has much to
offer employers, this is not to say that employers will welcome it with open arms.
This is because greater centralization entails daunting coordination problems.
Greater bargaining centralization will be rational for individual employers only if
most, perhaps all, employers participate. Hence, to be clear, I do not propose that
unions must somehow limit or minimize their demands for economic fairness in
order to conform to the supposedly ineluctable forces of globalization and
technological change. Nor do I suggest that if merely the culture or attitudes of U.S.
unionism change—by acting, for example, more “cooperatively”—that employers
will learn to embrace labor unions. Rather, to emphasize the point, the required
changes are fairly and deeply organizational and structural. Thus, ultimately, the
revitalization of unions is still a matter of power against potentially strong and

3. See Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr. & Håkan Locking, Wage Dispersion and Productive Efficiency: Evidence
for Sweden, 18 J. LAB. ECON. 755, 756 (2000) (observing that national “peak level” bargaining prevailed
without interruption in Sweden from 1956 to 1983).
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oppositional interests. Yet, notwithstanding the recognition of the importance of
power, I will also suggest that how that power is allocated matters a great deal, and
it is the resolution of this issue that will determine whether unions and collective
bargaining can be put on a more stable, long-run, “productive” path.
Part I of this Article defines and explicates the concept of centralization
through a brief comparative and historical analysis of the origins and persistence of
different collective bargaining structures across developed countries. The main
insight provided in this Part is that differences in bargaining structure between the
United States and parts of Europe have to do with different historical “initial
conditions.” In particular, the presence of democratic or authoritarian governments
(including the initial legal response to unionization) as well as the timing of
industrialization played important roles in shaping the structure of collective
bargaining in the now developed part of the world. Part II of the Article explains
the consequences of centralization and why it matters for unions, employers, and
any future for collective bargaining. This Part focuses on how different bargaining
structures shape unions’ responses at the bargaining table to risk in the labor market,
influence employers’ investments in physical and human capital, and ultimately
determine in large part to what extent employers oppose unions. Part II will also
explain why greater centralization also has a larger impact on income inequality than
more decentralized bargaining. Part III considers the legal context for centralization
and the extent to which American labor law encourages decentralization or impedes
centralization. In this Part, I suggest that particular legal provisions of the National
Labor Relations Act contribute to more decentralized collective bargaining, but that,
for the most part, U.S. labor law is more a reflection of the dominant structures of
collective bargaining rather than the reverse. This is in some ways good news, since
it suggests at once both a more focused and a less demanding agenda for labor law
reform. Finally, Part IV examines the normative and policy implications of
collective bargaining structure and suggests possible paths to change in the U.S.
context. Admittedly, changing the structure of bargaining seems like a distant longrange, or at best, a medium-range goal of the labor movement. Nevertheless, this
Part will argue that thinking about bargaining structure does dictate some important
ways unions should organize both themselves as organizations and new workers in
the present day.
I. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. History and “Initial Conditions” Behind Different Collective Bargaining Structures
It will be easier to understand and grasp the overwhelming importance of the
collective bargaining structure when examined in its comparative and historical
context. Basically, in a familiar path-dependence type of story, the initial conditions
for union organization were different between northern and continental Europe
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and the United States (and other Anglo-American countries). These different initial
conditions led to different forms of collective bargaining structures.4
In countries that industrialized early, such as the United Kingdom and the
United States, the first form of labor unionism that emerged was what is generally
described as craft unionism.5 Craft unions organized a specific—often quite
narrow—skill or trade and advanced their members’ interests by reserving access to
job markets for workers the union had trained while rigorously excluding all others.6
Control over a specific skill, furthermore, required extending control over the
organization of work.7 Craft unions aimed, and were often successful, at imposing
on employers a division of labor—ably captured by the philosophy of “job control”:
job demarcations, job territories, rules against job dilution, and so forth—tailored
to fit the union’s skill.8 Such objectives often entailed the opposition to the
introduction of new technologies or new organizations of work. The “crowning
achievement” of craft unionism was the closed shop, which required employers
seeking to employ labor of a particular skill to hire only members of the union that
controlled that skill.9 Organizing on the basis of skill or occupation, craft unions
often transcended workplace boundaries.10 However, because craft unions often
exerted control through their skill monopoly (rather than through strikes and
collective bargaining)11 and because of the more local nature of early markets,
collective bargaining, to the extent it existed at all, was weak and highly
decentralized. This is seen most evidently in the historical American Federation of
Labor, which raised union autonomy to a fundamental principle.12 Narrowness and
exclusivity, social as well as economic, was the hallmark of craft unionism.

4. Much of the following discussion relies on the research of Wolfgang Streeck. See Wolfgang
Streeck & Anke Hassel, Trade Unions as Political Actors, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF TRADE
UNIONS 335 ( John T. Addison & Claus Schnabel eds., 2003); Wolfgang Streeck, The Sociology of Labor
Markets and Trade Unions, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 254, 266–68 (Neil J. Smelser
& Richard Swedberg eds., 2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter Streeck, Labor Markets]; Wolfgang Streeck, Skills
and Politics: General and Specific, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COLLECTIVE SKILL FORMATION 317,
317–52 (Marius R. Busemeyer & Christine Trampusch eds., 2012) [hereinafter Streeck, Skills and
Politics].
5. Streeck, Labor Markets, supra note 4, at 266.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Streeck, Skills and Politics, supra note 4, at 319.
10. Id. (explaining that by imposing the same organization of work across employers within
their jurisdiction, craft unions could ensure “that union members could exercise their skills in a large
number of workplaces, making such skills transportable across employers”).
11. Streeck, Labor Markets, supra note 4, at 266 (observing that craft unions “operated much like
cartels of small business firms” and “often unilaterally set prices for specified jobs, rather than
negotiating wages with employers”); Streeck, Skills and Politics, supra note 4 at 318 (stating similarly that
craft unions “continued to behave like business cartels, and where they became powerful they were able
to dictate to employers on a wide range of subjects”).
12. See ROBERT FITCH, SOLIDARITY FOR SALE 72–75 (2006) (arguing that “[t]he very creation
of the AFL represented a revolt against union solidarity in favor of separation over unity and local
autonomy over concerted national action”).
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The formation of the Congress of Industrial Organizations in 1935 is
supposed to have marked the end of craft unionism and the emergence of industrial
unionism in the United States.13 But the break that occurred was—fatally, it now
seems—incomplete. As Wolfgang Streeck observes, industrial unions in “craftdominated environments adapted elements of the modus operandi of their
predecessors,”14 “relying on seniority rights and promotion ladders as functional
equivalents of skill and apprenticeship, on the union shop as a substitute for the
closed shop, and on internal rather than external labor markets.”15 As much, if not
more, a feature of craft unionism, industrial unions sought to impose on employers
through collective agreement an elaborate and detailed system of job control. “The
common tendency everywhere,” writes David Brody of the postwar industrial
unions, “was toward an ever greater expansion of the contractual net, from the great
body of umpire rulings compiled in the 517-page Steelworkers Handbook on Arbitration
Decisions (1960) to the innumerable specifics incorporated into the local agreements
that increasingly supplemented the master contracts in multiplant firms.”16
Industrial unionism, as it developed in other European countries, took a very
different course.17 As a consequence of both late industrialization and a relative
absence of democracy, industrial unionism in Europe never had to contend with
the overhang of a craft-union environment.18 A more restrictive and authoritarian
legal environment had abolished the guilds, which prevented the development of
craft unionism from these closely-analogous institutional forms.19 Skill-based trade
union organization made little sense to the technology and organization of
production that came with late industrialization, which was characterized by larger
factories and greater complements of unskilled and semiskilled workers.20
Given these different origins and organizational forms, the objectives of laterindustrializing, industrial unions were also quite different from their craft union
counterparts. Because these unions were comprised of workers of varying skills,
their memberships were more heterogeneous.21 Consequently, such unionism
13. Christopher L. Tomlins, AFL Unions in the 1930s: Their Performance in Historical Perspective, 65
J. AM. HIST. 1021, 1021 (1979) (“[H]istorians have generally agreed that the 1930s [following the
founding of the Congress of Industrial Organizations] saw the ascendancy of industrial over craft
unionism.”).
14. Streeck, Labor Markets, supra note 4, at 267.
15. Streeck, Skills and Politics, supra note 4, at 319.
16. DAVID BRODY, WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA: ESSAYS ON THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY STRUGGLE 201–02 (1980).
17. Streeck, Labor Markets, supra note 4, at 267.
18. Id.
19. Id. (explaining that authoritarian political regimes in Europe “refused unions a right to
organize, in the name of rapid modernization of their societies and anxious not to fall behind in
international economic and military competition” (citation omitted)).
20. Id. (“As the beginnings of unionization coincided with the arrival of large factories, unions
organized on a class or industrial basis, encompassing workers of all skills and trades and thereby
redistributing and equalizing bargaining power between stronger and weaker sections of the
workforce.”).
21. Id.
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embraced broader and more universal definitions of worker interests than the
narrow and exclusive craft unions.22 Industrial unions sought to equalize the pay
and employment status of workers within and across firms. To quote Wolfgang
Streeck at length:
Organizing across trades, [industrial unions] had little use for job control;
and organizing industry-wide across employers, they preferred centralized
collective bargaining to make the economic situation or workers as
independent from that of their employer as possible. Rather than
challenging the right of employers to reorganize work and introduce new
technology, industrial unions defended the occupational skills of their
members through involvement in industrial training and public labor
market policy . . . .23
Thus, if anything, industrial unions sought to accommodate their members’ interests
to the demands of their capitalist employers, rather than impose their own limiting
and restrictive rules on employers’ deployment of technology and labor. In one
particularly interesting example, Swedish trade union economist Gösta Rehn
described the policy goals of Sweden’s inaugural version of its famous active labor
market policy.24 The purpose (as it remains in contemporary versions of active labor
market policy today) was to enhance the ability of workers to change jobs, rather
than to protect their current jobs.25 Rehn described this policy as offering the “safety
of wings,” as opposed to the “safety of the snail’s shell.”26
In sum, different historical “initial conditions” gave rise to different
organizations of unions and collective bargaining between Europe and AngloAmerican countries. In particular, early industrialization and a fairly tolerant legal
regime allowed craft unionism to flourish in the United States and her sister
Anglophone countries.27 Craft unionism existed as localized and very loosely
federated organizations of occupations, relying on skill monopoly, restrictive
practices, and job control as its organizational repertoires.28 When larger-scale
industrialization came, industrial unionism took root in craft-dominated labor
markets and correspondingly adopted functionally equivalent practices to their
predecessors.29 In contrast, trade unionism came later, with more rapid

22. Id. at 268.
23. Id.
24. Lennart Erixon, The Rehn-Meidner Model in Sweden: Its Rise, Challenges and Survival, 44 J. ECON.
ISSUES 677, 681 (2010) (arguing for “[s]ecurity by wings” consisting of mobility-enhancing policies and
unemployment benefits as opposed to “security under shells” consisting of laws and collective
agreements on job security).
25. Id.
26. PETER A. SWENSON, CAPITALISTS AGAINST MARKETS 275 (2002); see also Erixon, supra
note 24, at 681 (rendering the translation as the “security of wings” to the “security under shells”).
27. Michael T. Hannan & John Freeman, The Ecology of Organizational Founding: American Labor
Unions, 1836–1985, 92 AM. J. SOC. 910, 927 (1987).
28. Streeck, Labor Markets, supra note 4, at 267, 269.
29. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS,
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 253–54 (1985).
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industrialization, a less tolerant legal regime, and the absence of a craft-union
“overhang.”30 The consequence was a weakness of union organization at the local
level coupled with an organization of work and technology that dictated broader
and more universal trade union repertoires. Ultimately, this led to a strong and
adversarial “shop floor” orientation in American unions that was resistant to
employer prerogatives over technology and the organization of work.31 In Europe,
unions were more accommodating to what is described nowadays as “functional
labor market flexibility.”32
Readers familiar with Europe’s high level of employment protection legislation
and firm-level forms of workplace representation (such as Germany’s works
councils)33 may read the assertions of Europe’s greater workplace flexibility with
some skepticism. However, it is quite easy to misinterpret the European reality and
to project parochial aspirations onto “other” models. First and most importantly,
focusing on employment protection misses the critical distinction between functional
and external-numerical labor market flexibility.34 Employment protection legislation
primarily concerns external-numerical flexibility, which refers to the flexibility
employers have in hiring and firing workers.35 In contrast, functional flexibility
refers to the ability employers have to transfer and move employees between
different tasks and activities within the firm.36 It is this latter kind of flexibility that
is the main focus of the contrast described above and implicated by the practices of
internal labor markets, seniority, job classifications, and the whole panoply of job
control measures. Several observations bear out the surprisingly higher level of
functional flexibility found in some European, as compared to American,
establishments.37 One confirmation of the rigidity of American internal labor
markets is given by looking at earnings profiles based on tenure across countries
with different levels of bargaining centralization.38 Pay increases based on length of
30. See COEN TEULINGS & JOOP HARTOG, CORPORATISM OR COMPETITION? 130–62 (1998).
31. Id.
32. Vassilis Monastiriotis, Labour Market Flexibility in UK Regions, 1979–1998, 39 AREA 310,
310–22 (2007).
33. Id.
34. The distinction was introduced in JOHN ATKINSON, FLEXIBILITY, UNCERTAINTY, AND
MANPOWER MANAGEMENT 11–12 (1984). In fact, Atkinson defines two other forms of flexibility,
internal-numerical flexibility and financial or wage flexibility, in addition to external-numerical and
functional flexibility. See id. Internal-numerical flexibility is the flexibility achieved in being able to adjust
working hours and schedules, for instance as through part-time or over-time work, for current
employees. See id. Financial or wage flexibility refers to the degree of variability in workers’ wages and
compensation according to individual or market criteria. See id. at 12.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Streeck, Skills and Politics, supra note 4, at 321 (writing that “German industry was apparently
much better than its Anglo-American competition at absorbing technological change and work
reorganization and at industrial restructuring in general” and that the level of training of German manual
workers was so high that “they were easy to retrain and redeploy in internal labor markets, while at the
same time they were highly mobile in the external labor market because of their certified portable
skills”).
38. TEULINGS & HARTOG, supra note 30, at 37 tbl.1.2, 41–42.
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service are a key feature of internal labor markets.39 The Dutch economists Teulings
and Hartog find that the “tenure related wage growth in noncorporatist [i.e.,
decentralized] countries is easily two to three times as large as in the corporatist [i.e.,
centralized] countries.”40
Second, it should be noted that high levels of employment protection in
Europe are of relatively recent vintage, and came possibly as a response to the wave
of industrial restructuring that followed the monetary and economic crises of the
late 1960s and 1970s.41 Prior to this period, one only need read a few cases regarding
personal dismissals in Sweden to realize that, at precisely the same time American
unions were consolidating control over internal labor markets and defending “just
cause” dismissal rules, Swedish employers enjoyed an astonishing level of both
functional and external labor market flexibility.42 Finally, one must also
acknowledge that, even given the relatively recent constraints on external flexibility,
the amount of employment protection varies significantly between countries.43 For
instance, Denmark has had for some time highly organized and centralized
bargaining coupled with low employment protection (and generous unemployment
insurance and active labor market policies as substitutes).44
It is likewise misleading to see European works councils as an overriding
constraint on employers’ deployment of labor and technology.45 Works councils fill
a “representation gap” left by the more universalizing, and therefore less

39.

See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION
CHANGING WORKPLACE 53–56 (2004). In the ideal-typical internal labor market, jobs are
arranged by seniority, with hiring from the external market only for entry-level positions at the bottom
of the scale. Promotions to higher positions, with higher pay, are made to employees who stay with the
firm. Id. at 53. Thus, tenure-related pay differentials have little to do with merit, productivity, or what
the employee could get on the external labor market. Economists’ rationale for this arrangement is that
tenure-related pay increases are actually a form of deferred compensation, meant to incentivize the
worker to stay with the firm so that employers will be able recoup the investment in training her. Id. at
54–55.
40. TEULINGS & HARTOG, supra note 30, at 41.
41. This latter claim appears at least to be true for Sweden. See JONAS PONTUSSON,
INEQUALITY AND PROSPERITY: SOCIAL EUROPE VS. LIBERAL AMERICA 125–26 (2005) (“In the
context of severe industrial adjustment problems, the Swedish labor movement embraced employment
protection in the 1970s, but this was essentially a defensive move.”). Moreover, employment protection
legislation for other large European countries also dates from the same period. See, e.g., ROGER
BLANPAIN ET AL., THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE EMPLOYMENT
LAW 571, 635 (2d ed. 2012) (identifying 1969 and 1973 as the years in which Germany and France
passed unjust dismissal legislation).
42. Erixon, supra note 24, at 681.
43. See Margarita Estevez-Abe et al., Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation
of the Welfare State, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM 145 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).
44. See generally Per Kongshøj Madsen, The Danish Model of “Flexicurity”: Experiences and Lessons,
10 TRANSFER: EUR. REV. LAB. & RES. 187 (2004) (describing the Danish model of “flexicurity,” built
on the “golden triangle” of a flexible labor market, generous unemployment insurance, and extensive
job training and retraining policies).
45. See, e.g., Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck, The Study of Works Councils: Concepts and Problems, in
WORKS COUNCILS 3, 11–20 ( Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1995) (highlighting the historically
ambivalent attitude toward works councils by both unions and employers).
FOR THE
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particularizing, industry-level representation of workers’ interests by unions.46 In
fact, as in the case of Germany, works-council legislation was passed by a
conservative government as a way to limit the influence of unions at the workplace
level.47 Works councils often enjoy only the rights to be consulted by the employer,
the right to be heard, and sometimes a right to veto particular employer decisions.48
But rarely do they impose a full right of negotiation or duty to bargain on
employers.49 Even where they do, as in Germany, corresponding rights of a works
council to strike are forbidden.50 Thus, works councils often establish a much
“weaker” level of worker representation than American unions do at the workplace
level. Accordingly, it is better to see works councils as a kind of “company union”
or “employee representation plan,” which is why proposals for an American version
of works councils that frequently appear in American discussions typically run afoul
of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) section 8(a)(2) ban on employerdominated unions.51 This is not to say that works councils are completely without
legitimacy for workers. Even the right to be heard is significant and the lack of
strong rights may, perhaps surprisingly, contribute to a more cooperative and
46. See BLANPAIN ET AL., supra note 41, at 597 (contrasting sectoral representation by unions
with the “institution of works councils,” which provide “a mechanism for individualizing the
relationship between the employer and employee at each workplace”).
47. See id. (explaining that while “there is a long history of various laws dealing with works
councils, the 1952 Industrial Relations Regulation Act was enacted by a conservative government with
the goal of keeping unions off the shop floor and limiting their influence to sectoral bargaining”).
48. This is the case in France, for example. See id. at 661 (distinguishing French works councils,
or employee representation committees, from the German version, and noting that in France an
employer is obligated to “provide information and consult with the committee before implementing
mergers, worker transfers, employee dismissals, layoffs, and employee training,” but that French works
councils “were never empowered by law to participate in management decisions as are works councils
in Germany”).
49. As compared to the French version, German works councils have much stronger legal
rights. “On some issues, the works council only has a right to information and to be heard; on some
issues, the works council has a right of approval and veto; and on others, there is a right to
codetermination [i.e., right to bargain].” Id. at 599. The number of subjects over which German works
councils have codetermination is impressive: scheduling work hours, temporary work reductions,
increases in overtime, when and where wages are paid, vacation policies, introduction of new technical
control systems affecting employment, workplace safety rules, employees benefits (such as cafeterias),
and the overall salary structure. Id.
50. Id. at 598 (explaining that a works council “cannot call a strike and must remain neutral
during one, but members of the works council may themselves participate as individuals in legal strikes
called by the union”). An exception is the case of Spain. See Modesto Escobar, Spain: Works Councils or
Unions?, in WORKS COUNCILS, supra note 45, at 153, 164 (“While works councils in other European
countries typically have no legal recourse to the strike, Spanish councils do.”). Of course, with the
Spanish Civil War and the Franco dictatorship, the history of the Spanish labor movement contrasts
significantly from other European labor movements. It is notable that stronger works councils coincide
with practices that tend to converge with more American features. Id. (explaining that Spanish councils
exercise significant control over managerial decisions, participate in the governance of internal labor
markets, disfavor functional or geographic mobility, and, on the basis of these practices, can transform
a plant into a de facto closed shop in situations where there is a dominant union). Thus, the exception
tends to prove the rule.
51. See, for example, the historical and legal discussion in Joel Rogers, United States: Lessons from
Abroad and Home, in WORKS COUNCILS, supra note 45, at 375, 389–402.
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collaborative, but certainly no less meaningful, form of worker participation. In all,
works councils probably lend to workplace and technological change an extremely
valuable due process dimension. But incipient soviets they are clearly not.
B. Brief Comparative Analysis of Collective Bargaining Structures
For readers wanting a more analytically precise picture of how collective
bargaining structures differ across countries, Table 1 and Figure 1 provide some
comparative, cross-country data on collective bargaining and union centralization.
Table 1 lists several different measures of centralization by country, with countries
grouped, for expositional convenience, by Esping-Andersen’s welfare-state
typology.52 As in Esping-Andersen’s argument, this three-fold division of countries
represents important historical divergences between countries, such as those
mentioned in the previous section, Part I.A.53 The first two data columns
(“Centralization” and “Coordination”) capture two related but slightly different
aggregate measures of centralization.54 The final three columns (“Level,”
“Authority,” and “Concentration”) are disaggregated measures of the first two.
“Level” measures the predominant level at which collective bargaining takes place
(firm, industry, or nation) in the country,55 while “Authority” measures the
allocation of authority within union organizations56 and “Concentration” refers to
the proportion of union members within a particular affiliate or federation, while
taking into account both the number of affiliates and federations.57
52. GØSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 22–23
(1990).
53. Id.
54. Two measures are provided only because, while I believe the first measure—
Centralization—is more accurate than the second, it covers only the years 1973–1993. The
Coordination score covers the years 1960–2010.
55. “Level” provides a basic measure of bargaining centralization and gives the average,
dominant level at which wage bargaining takes place in a particular country over the years 1960 through
2010, with higher scores indicating greater centralization. Bargaining is more decentralized when it takes
place at a lower level, for example, when wage bargaining is conducted by a local union and a single
company or even workplace. Bargaining is more centralized when it occurs between, for example, a
single industry-wide union and an employer’s association representing employers in the same industry.
An even more centralized organization of bargaining happens when a federation of unions covering
different industries and an equivalent employer’s association bargain at a national level.
56. This concept is distinct from bargaining centralization. Rather than referring to the level at
which bargaining between firms and unions takes place, it instead measures the allocation of authority
within union organizations. The index is an average for each country over the years 1960 through 2010
and includes several different measures of authority, such as a national union’s control (vis-à-vis a local
union) over finances, strike funds, appointment of workplace representatives, and its veto power over
a local union’s decision to strike or make a company-level agreement. The index also captures the level
of union authority at both federation and national affiliate level. Thus, a more centralized union is one
where key decisions over strikes, finances, and appointments are concentrated at a higher level, at
national affiliates rather than local unions, or at federations rather than national affiliates. For further
discussion of these measures, see Visser, infra note 58 and accompanying text.
57. The “Concentration” index builds on the “Authority” index by adding a measure of union
concentration to the measure of the allocation of authority within union organization. Union
concentration refers to the proportion of union members within an affiliate or federation, while taking
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Table 1: Indices of Union Centralization58
Centralization

Coordination

Level

Authority

Concentration

Liberal
Australia
Canada
United Kingdom
United States

0.19
0.47
0.07
0.17
0.07

1.73
2.73
1.24
1.80
1.16

1.61
2.63
1.18
1.63
1.00

0.27
0.43
0.32
0.17
0.16

0.28
0.51
0.28
0.21
0.13

Conservative
Austria
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Switzerland

0.28
0.44
0.32
0.12
0.33
0.17
0.37
0.28

3.65
4.45
4.20
2.16
4.00
2.94
4.08
3.65

2.96
3.31
3.59
2.02
2.94
2.84
3.59
2.96

0.54
0.77
0.55
0.52
0.47
0.38
0.71
0.54

0.46
0.96
0.46
0.21
0.44
0.32
0.54
0.46

Social Democratic
Denmark
Finland
Norway
Sweden

0.48
0.46
0.42
0.53
0.49

4.09
4.04
3.96
4.27
4.08

3.75
3.02
3.90
4.12
3.75

0.63
0.63
0.45
0.78
0.63

0.51
0.53
0.39
0.58
0.51

Japan

0.26

3.76

1.00

0.12

0.22

Overall Mean

0.31

3.27

2.71

0.47

0.42

II. WHY UNION STRUCTURES MATTER
The brief comparative and historical analysis provided in Part I explains why
the level of bargaining centralization differs so markedly across countries, with the
United States occupying one end of the spectrum. This Part explores more fully the
implications of bargaining structures: Why does union centralization matter? What
consequences does it have for unions and their social and economic objectives? As
the discussion that follows will show, the reasons union structures matter are many,
with some reasons better understood than others.
A. Responses to Risk in the Labor Market
One important consequence of bargaining structure follows most directly
from the historical and comparative discussion. This consequence is that different
bargaining structures trigger different union responses to labor market risk. Labor

58. Data, compiled by the author, are from Jelle Visser, ICTWSS: Database on Institutional
Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts in 34 countries between 1960 and
2010, AIAS (April 2013), http://www.uva-aias.net/208.
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market risk—the threat of job loss or demotion produced variously by technological
change, the reorganization of work, or fluctuations in product markets and the
larger economy—is of course ubiquitous in capitalist economies dominated by wage
and salaried employment.59 When union structures are highly decentralized, the
rational and optimal response of unions to such risk is a strategy of job control.60
Precisely because of their decentralized structure, these unions do not have the
institutional or organizational means to influence labor market conditions beyond
their firm or narrow jurisdiction. Without such influence, a union’s best strategy for
addressing labor market risk is to protect the current jobs of its members: senioritybased layoff policies, job definitions and demarcations, internal labor markets, rules
limiting employer discretion over technology, manning and staffing requirements,
and so forth.
In contrast, the rational response to risk is very different for centralized
unions. Job control may be one way of protecting workers from the vicissitudes of
economic uncertainty and change, but it may come at a significant cost to workplace
productivity.61 More centralized union organization and collective bargaining, which
covers a broader and more diverse range of workers, will feel the “negative
externalities” of job-control policies—higher unemployment and lower wages in
different workplaces or in related, but “downstream” industries—more acutely than
decentralized unions.62 In addition, more centralized union organization and
collective bargaining will have the institutional means—for example, a greater ability
to solve coordination problems—to transcend narrow job-control tendencies.63
Thus, more centralized unions will have both the interest as well as the means to
bargain for broader responses to labor market risk. Such responses include wage
compression (which by reducing the variance of wages, reduces the uncertainty and
risk associated with workers’ reemployment prospects) and employer-based job
training and retraining, as well as a panoply of more comprehensive public policy
solutions, such as more generous unemployment insurance benefits and active
labor-market policies.64
This risk explanation for the contrasting negotiation objectives of unions in

59. For a general discussion of risk in the labor market and in particular how it is related to
social welfare policy, see Estevez-Abe et al., supra note 43.
60. Although the response of unions to risk has been analyzed abundantly, the general argument
pursued in this subsection—that different union structures induce distinct policy responses to labor
market risk—is novel.
61. Streeck, Skills and Politics, supra note 4, at 319.
62. This idea is an extension of the popular insight of Mancur Olson. See Michael Wallerstein
& Karl Ove Moene, Does the Logic of Collective Action Explain the Logic of Corporatism?, 15 J. THEORETICAL
POL. 271, 271–72 (2003) (explaining how, according to Mancur Olson’s theory of collective action,
broader and more inclusive “encompassing” organizations will internalize negative externalities and
therefore not advocate for policies that increase the level of public bads).
63. For the idea that more centralized or more coordinated labor unions will be more effective
at shaping public policy, see generally Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further “Reflections on the Distinctive
Character of American Labor Laws,” 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1 (1990).
64. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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centralized and decentralized bargaining relationships also helps explain why
industrial unions in “craft-dominated environments,” such as in the United States,
responded so differently to risk than European industrial unions in Europe. To the
extent it has existed at all, industry-level bargaining in the United States has been
found, with varying levels of success, only in industries such as steel, coal, and
trucking.65 Unions and the workers covered under such agreements were therefore
small islands in a sea of firms and jobs that either had more traditional craft unions
or were completely unorganized.66 The existence of both presented dim prospects
for workers facing the possibility of job loss under industry agreements. Skill
requirements and the variety of job control measures erected stiff barriers to entry
in the craft sector, while low wages and poor job quality made the unorganized
sector a very unattractive place to work.67 Under these circumstances, the rational
response for the few unions pursuing legitimately sector-level bargaining was to
reproduce the job-control equivalents of craft unionism. As in Europe, a broader,
political response to labor market risk would have required a much greater coverage
of workers in all different industries and a much more coordinated strategy among
industrial unions—such as a stronger, more centralized union confederation or at
least all (or most) unions following the same, universalizing political strategy.68
Thus, where decentralized unions favor job-control strategies as a way to
address labor-market risk, centralized unions prefer broader, universal, and more
“political” solutions. The key implication of these alternatives is their different
consequences for workplace productivity. Job-control strategies restrict the
employer’s ability to adopt new technologies or reorganize jobs and the workplace,
while more universal strategies give employers more discretion over these decisions.
B. Productivity Investments
Centralized bargaining influences workplace productivity in several additional
ways beyond those created by different labor-market risk policies. One of the most
frequent arguments in favor of the productivity-enhancing consequences of central
bargaining is that it reduces what economists call “opportunism” or the “hold-up”
problem.69 In general, the problem is as follows. Productive assets—machinery,
65. Harry C. Katz, The Decentralization of Collective Bargaining: A Literature Review and Comparative
Analysis, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 3, 11 (1993) (comparing the “relatively decentralized” United
States and United Kingdom to countries with more centralized bargaining and identifying the decline
of multiemployer bargaining in steel, coal, and trucking in the United States).
66. Recall that at its peak, union density in the United States never exceeded forty percent of
the workforce. Furthermore, unlike industry bargaining in Europe, the coverage of union contracts
remained closely tied to the level of union membership.
67. See generally Marc L. Silver, Rethinking Craft Administration: Managerial Position, Work Autonomy,
and Employment Security in the Building Trades, 5 SOC. F. 241, 244 (1990) (discussing the autonomy of those
in craft unions in the construction industry to choose the method of their work).
68. See Marick F. Masters, Federal-Employee Unions and Political Action, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 612, 624, 627 (1985) (discussing the political lobbying unification and centralized nature of several
federal worker unions).
69. The “opportunism” problem was first introduced and analyzed by the institutional
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tools, skills—often have a certain level of specificity: they are good for one or few
uses, but not others.70 For instance, a dedicated piece of machinery may be useful
for assembling electronic devices, but it is not much use for doing anything else.
Similarly, a computer programmer may be highly skilled in her trade, but her
knowledge is of little use in chemistry or commercial design. Such “asset specificity”
presents a contractual problem when both sides of the bargain need to commit
something to the enterprise.71 The problem presented by specific assets is that once
one party commits, the other may seek to extract additional concessions.72 For
instance, once one side acquires special machinery, the other side may feign a change
in business circumstances requiring a higher share of the gains from the venture.73
Since the assets are specific, the party being “held up” cannot simply walk away
from the demand, and is best off conceding.
At this point, a problem of opportunism seems simply unfair. But there are
larger concerns. If parties anticipate holdups or opportunism, then this will make
them less willing to acquire or invest their specific assets.74 This reduces the overall
investment in specific assets and therefore makes everyone worse off.75 In other
words, not only is opportunism unfair, but it also lowers economic output.
Though opportunism is present in many kinds of contracting relationships, it
is also pervasive in the employment relationship. The employment relationship is
potentially long-term, exchanges are not “spot market” or simultaneous, and the
future of the relationship is uncertain—particularly when an at-will presumption
prevails.76 Employers’ physical investments are often specific, as are workers’
skills—human capital cannot be diversified. As such, opportunities for holdups
abound on both sides. Employees may strike or quit at inopportune times for the
employer, demanding extra concessions in order not to do so. Employers may
withhold pay or training—or employees’ jobs themselves—in order to extract assetspecific rents.
Given the existence and pervasiveness of these holdup problems, the
argument is that centralized wage bargaining can ameliorate them. To illustrate this,
I will analyze two such opportunism scenarios; the first involves a firm’s capital
investment, and the second, employees’ skills.

economist Oliver Williamson and will be further elaborated below. For discussions, see WILLIAMSON,
supra note 29, 114–15; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 47–48 (1996).
70. WILLIAMSON, supra note 69, at 47–48.
71. Id. Both sides may bring specific assets to the table, but it is sufficient that only one side’s
assets be specific.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. This aspect gets particular attention in the formal literature. See, e.g., Oliver Hart & John
Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1122–25 (1990) (illustrating
through example how asset-specific problems of opportunism can reduce investment and economic
efficiency).
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., infra note 77 and accompanying text.
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1. Physical Capital
The greatest potential for holdup over an employer’s investment in physical
or productivity investments would appear to be the case where a union bargains
with only that firm’s or plant’s employees.77 An individual employee’s threat to quit
after the company’s installation of a new machine unless the company pays her more
may not be terribly credible, unless that employee is the only person that can run
the machine. When all employees can strike, however, the threat is quite real. Thus,
firm-level collective bargaining presents a particularly acute potential for
opportunism.
Central wage bargaining overcomes this problem.78 When a union bargains for
the workers of multiple employers, the resulting wage will be some average of
productivity across firms.79 One firm’s investment will only partly influence this
average, so the bargained wage will not change much as a response.80 The firm can
be assured that it will be able to recoup the majority of its investment. If the number
of firms is large enough, then the wage in effect becomes independent of each
employer’s investment.81
Timing also matters. Note that the holdup problem only exists to the extent
that the opportunistic party can renegotiate after the investment has been made.82 If
wages or other terms are fixed for a long enough period before a firm makes an
investment decision, then these terms will not change once the investment is made,
and the firm will face no disincentive to invest.83 Similarly, firms are unlikely to make
their investment decisions all at the same time, so it may be useful to think of central
wage bargaining as occurring before investment decisions are made, which again
removes the holdup problem.
There is some evidence that bargaining structure does influence the
investment and productivity decisions of firms.84 Making a comprehensive review
77. For the first formal analyses of the holdup problem in the context of physical capital
investments and firm-union bargaining, see Paul A. Grout, Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding
Contracts: A Nash Bargaining Approach, 52 ECONOMETRICA 449 (1984); and Simon Anderson & Michael
Devereux, Trade Unions and the Choice of Capital Stock, 90 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 27 (1988).
78. For analysis along the lines of this paragraph, see K.O. Moene et al., Bargaining Structure and
Economic Performance, in TRADE UNION BEHAVIOUR, PAY BARGAINING, AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 63, 109–14 (R.J. Flanagan et al. eds., 1993).
79. See id. at 111–12.
80. See id. at 113.
81. See id.
82. See PIERRE CAHUC & ANDRÉ ZYLBERBERG, LABOR ECONOMICS 411–14 (William
McCuaig trans., The MIT Press 2004) (2001) (showing formally that the existence of the holdup
problem is equivalent to supposing that investment decisions are made before wage bargaining, and its
absence to supposing that investment decisions are made after wage bargaining).
83. See Grout, supra note 77, at 450–51 (contrasting the cases of the United States, which
enforces collective bargaining agreements, and the United Kingdom, which does not, and predicting
that investment under the U.S. rule will be higher, all else being equal, because unions in the United
Kingdom can strike and renegotiate the agreement at any time due to its lack of enforceability).
84. Following the theoretical analyses of the investment holdup problem described above,
several studies support the view that unionization in countries with decentralized bargaining is
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of forty separate empirical studies of the impact of unions on innovation, the
economists Naercio Menezes-Filho and John Van Reenen report that North
American (mostly U.S.) studies “find consistently negative impacts of unions on
[research and development spending].”85 In contrast, unions in Europe do not
appear to reduce spending on research and development.86
2. Human Capital
Investments in human capital face a similar dilemma, but with some different
and very interesting implications. Intuitively, we think of the employee as
contemplating the critical investment, and of the firm using its bargaining power to
extract more of the workers’ productivity at a lower wage cost. If this is the scenario,
employees will be less willing to bear the costs of education and training if they
cannot reap all of the gains from doing so. In addition, we also typically think of the
education and skills in question as more or less specific. If this is not the case, and
the skills in question are general—they can be employed in any or most firms—the
employee can simply quit and work for another employer. The special requirement
of the holdup problem—asset specificity—does not exist in the case of general
human capital.87
However, if there are some imperfections in the labor market, the dilemma of
human capital investment actually extends beyond the specific case.88 Any problem
that would prevent a worker from obtaining her marginal productivity in her next

associated with lower investment in research and development and/or physical capital. See Stephen G.
Bronars et al., The Effects of Unions on Firm Behavior: An Empirical Analysis Using Firm-Level Data, 33 INDUS.
REL. 426 (1994) (finding that unionization is associated with less investment in durable assets, such as
research and development, in the United States); Robert A. Connolly et al., Union Rent Seeking, Intangible
Capital, and Market Value of the Firm, 68 REV. ECON. & STAT. 567 (1986) (finding that unionization is
associated with lower investment in research and development in the United States); Kevin Denny &
Stephen J. Nickell, Unions and Investment in British Industry, 102 ECON. J. 874 (1992) (finding that
unionization is associated with lower investment rates in the United Kingdom); Barry T. Hirsch, Firm
Investment Behavior and Collective Bargaining Strategy, 31 INDUS. REL. 95 (1992) (finding that unionization is
associated with lower investment in research and development and physical capital in the United States);
Cameron W. Odgers & Julian R. Betts, Do Unions Reduce Investment? Evidence from Canada, 51 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 18 (1997) (finding that unionization is associated with lower net investment rates in
Canada).
85. Naercio Menezes-Filho & John Van Reenen, Unions and Innovation, in INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK OF TRADE UNIONS, supra note 4, at 293, 328.
86. Id. at 328. A somewhat related study shows that wage compression associated with
centralized wage bargaining in Sweden was consistent with increases in productive efficiency as long as
it focused on reducing wage inequalities between firms and did not compress within firm wage
differentials too greatly. Hibbs, Jr. & Locking, supra note 3, at 755.
87. See generally Gary S. Becker, Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, 70 J. POL.
ECON. 9, 17–25 (1962) (discussing extensively the effect of specific, on-the-job training on job turnover
and decisions to quit and fire).
88. See generally Daron Acemoglu & Jörn-Steffen Pischke, The Structure of Wages and Investment in
General Training, 107 J. POL. ECON. 539 (1999) (discussing the necessity of labor market imperfections,
which imply that trained workers do not get paid their full marginal product when they change jobs, to
induce the possibility of firm-sponsored general training).
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best employment opportunity would create a holdup problem even for general
skills. A number of possibilities could generate such imperfections.89 One example
is the presence of search frictions in the labor market. If finding a new job is
uncertain, costly, or time consuming, the worker will not be able to obtain her
marginal productivity immediately upon leaving her present job. This presents a
problem of opportunism the employer can take advantage of.
Apart from this problem of opportunism, it would seem that centralized
bargaining would only make problems worse. Since centralized wage bargaining not
only raises wages for workers vis-à-vis firms and profits but also compresses wage
differentials across firms and workers, this would, as reigning economic wisdom
dictates, create worse incentives for workers to acquire skills. In the unreal but
illustratively useful case of an identical wage rate for any level of skill, it would seem
that workers would have absolutely no incentive to pay for training or education.
However, while this logic is true for employees, it is not true for employers.90
If wages become less variable with respect to skill differences, then employers will
now be sharing a larger gain in any productivity improvements of their employees.
In effect, employers now become the residual claimants on their employees’ skills.
Now, employers have an incentive to pay for the training of their employees. Even
more interestingly, if labor markets are imperfect or if employees are credit
constrained, then the level of employee skill in the economy may be higher under
centralized wage setting and a more compressed wage structure when the employer
undertakes the cost of training its employees.
Since the reasoning applies to general skills as much to specific skills, this
surprising outcome contravenes another basic tenet of human capital theory.91
Precisely because general skills can be used across a variety of employment settings,
the theory says that employees rather than employers should (as a predictive matter)
pay for them.92 Conversely, employers rather than employees should pay for specific
skills.93 Yet, a significant amount of evidence suggests precisely the opposite and
confirms the predicted effect of labor market imperfections.94
C. Employer Opposition
The preceding arguments can also help us understand another crucial
consequence of wage-bargaining centralization. It is commonly argued that
employers will oppose unionization of their workplaces to a greater extent when

89. See id. at 554–66.
90. See id. at 541.
91. Id.
92. See Becker, supra note 87, at 12–17.
93. See id. at 17–25.
94. See Daron Acemoglu & Jörn-Steffen Pischke, Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence, 113
Q.J. ECON. 79 (1998) (providing theory and evidence that firms provide training for workers in general
skills, and not just firm-specific skills).
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collective bargaining is decentralized.95 The reasoning is simple and follows the
previous logic. If a single unionized employer has to pay a higher wage than other
employers in the industry, then it will be placed at a competitive disadvantage.96 On
the other hand, if all employers in the industry are unionized and bargain with a
single union to pay a uniform wage, then none is particularly disadvantaged
compared to the others.97 Accordingly, employer opposition should be less intense
when industry bargaining prevails.
This basic logic is fundamentally correct, but I believe it misses an important
part of the story. Think about the problem this way. Under which scenario does an
employer stand to gain the most from defeating an incumbent union? When it is
the only unionized employer in the industry, or when all employers in the industry
are unionized? Arguably, the largest gains can be had when all other employers are
unionized, and one employer is able to operate as the only nonunion employer. For
certain, an employer does not want to be the only higher cost firm in the industry.
But it would profit even more if it were the only low-cost employer in the industry.
Thus, it seems plausible that employer opposition to unions would be greater under
industry-level bargaining than under firm-level bargaining. For this reason, I do not
believe the basic reasoning is fully adequate to explain why intuitively, as well as
empirically, employer opposition to unions appears to be less in countries with more
centralized bargaining.
What is needed to complete the story is something about the additional
benefits that centralized bargaining brings to employers. As argued above, these
include the productivity gains from greater workplace flexibility and higher
investment in human and physical capital that follows the mitigation of holdup
problems. Most of these benefits vanish if an employer resists the union and extracts
itself from a multiemployer bargaining structure. Thus, in addition to the
disadvantages presented by firm-level bargaining, one also needs to acknowledge the
advantages of industry-level bargaining for employers in order to understand why
employer opposition to unions recedes with greater wage-setting centralization.
Nevertheless, the critical conclusion remains that greater centralization can explain
why employers tend to oppose unions more in the United States than in many
European countries.
D. Income Inequality and “Taking Wages Out of Competition”
There is typically a strong economist’s presumption of a trade-off between
equality and efficiency.98 The previous sections of this Part explained why greater
centralization in collective bargaining is likely to have positive impacts on economic
95. See Rogers, supra note 63, at 37–38.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF 1 (1975); see also
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing
Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667 (1994).
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productivity and why more decentralized bargaining is likely to have negative
impacts. As this section will explain, greater centralization also reduces income
inequality more effectively and extensively than decentralized bargaining. Rather
than facing a trade-off between equality and efficiency, wage-setting centralization
remarkably appears to be able to deliver both.
All kinds of collective bargaining reduce income inequality, but centralized
bargaining has a larger effect than decentralized wage bargaining. Decentralized
bargaining reduces inequality primarily by compressing wages within firms.99 In
addition, but to a lesser extent, decentralized bargaining also reduces inequality
between firms through a kind of “union threat” effect: when organization of the
workforce seems like a reasonable possibility, employers will keep wages relatively
high in order to stave off unionization.100 In comparison, centralized bargaining also
reduces income inequality through both these channels, but with a more direct
impact on the between-firm channel, since agreements apply to all employers in the
industry.101 Overall, centralized bargaining reduces income inequality to a
dramatically greater extent than decentralized bargaining. Figure 2 reveals the
relationship between centralization and income inequality, as measured by the ratio
of earnings of the fiftieth percentile in the income distribution to the earnings of
the tenth percentile. As is shown, the relationship is strongly negative: greater
centralization is associated with lower income inequality.102

99. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 79–82 (1984)
(providing evidence that union wage policies lower inequality of wages within firms).
100. See Henry S. Farber, Nonunion Wage Rates and the Threat of Unionization, 58 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 335 (2005); Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage
Inequality, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 513, 517 (2011).
101. See Michael Wallerstein, Wage-Setting Institutions and Pay Inequality in Advanced Industrial
Societies, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 649 (1999) (finding that wage-bargaining centralization is the most
important factor explaining variation in earnings inequality across developed countries, with other
economic and political factors having little impact); see also Hibbs, Jr. & Locking, supra note 3 (discussing
the effects of centralized bargaining on between-firm and within-firm wage inequality).
102. There is a similar negative association between centralization and the ratio of income at
the ninetieth percentile to the income at the tenth percentile, which is a broader measure of inequality.
However, the impact of centralization on the 50-10 ratio is significantly stronger than on the 90-10
ratio, indicating that centralization (1) has a larger impact on the lower half of the income distribution
than on the upper half and (2) reduces inequality by raising income at the bottom more than reducing
income at the top. See generally Jonas Pontusson et al., Comparative Political Economy of Wage Distribution:
The Role of Partisanship and Labour Market Institutions, 32 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 281 (2002) (discussing the ways
different labor market institutions, including centralized wage bargaining, affect the distribution of
income in a country).
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number of workers employed by the firm.109 Of course, this is a situation the union
would like to avoid. Indeed, one possible response of the union in this case is to
lower its wage demands. This makes the employer’s product relatively less costly,
and saves unions jobs, but at the cost of higher wages. A union that is unable to
continuously raise wages is probably one seen as little deserving of its members’
loyalty or support.
The natural—and indeed historical—response of unions to the wage
constraining effects of product-market competition is to attempt to organize all
employers in the relevant product market.110 By coordinating their bargaining
demands, unions at each employer can avoid undercutting one another’s wages. The
consequence is a wage level higher than any one union at a single employer would
have been able to achieve. Of course, higher wages at all employers also reduces
product demand.111 But wage coordination avoids the specific substitution effect
caused by buyers switching between the goods of different employers. The
aggregate wage-employment bargain reached by coordinated bargaining is better for
unions than what they could achieve separately.
By taking wages out of competition, unions are able to exert greater control
over a central union objective. Greater centralization is critical for reducing income
inequality both between firms as well as between capital and labor. Any labor
movement that wants to have a serious impact on income inequality needs to pursue
greater bargaining centralization.
E. Macroeconomic Benefits
Finally, the consequences of differences in union structures extend beyond the
microeconomic dimensions of investments, productivity, and the rules and
institutions governing the workplace. In fact, much of the early discussion and
analysis about bargaining structure had to do with its effects on unemployment and
inflation.112 I will not dwell on this topic much now, since by this point the reader
should see clearly enough the importance of bargaining centralization through its
varied effects on functional flexibility, physical and human capital investment,
employer opposition, and income inequality. Suffice it to say, centralized bargaining
can help prevent inflationary wage-price spirals, such as occurred in the late-1970s
United States, and consequently further encourage investment and increase
employment.113 This feature of centralized bargaining is particularly important as a
109. Id.
110. Many of the famous, pre-Wagner Act American labor law cases involved situations where
unions were attempting to bargain with firms on a broader, more coordinated basis. See, e.g., Derek C.
Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394, 1398 (1971).
111. Dowrick, supra note 106.
112. For the starting point of a large literature on the macroeconomics of wage-bargaining
centralization, see Lars Calmfors & John Driffill, Bargaining Structure, Corporatism, and Macroeconomic
Performance, 3 ECON. POL’Y 13 (1988).
113. See generally Erixon, supra note 24 (describing the inflationary and macroeconomic
implications of centralized wage bargaining as understood by Swedish trade union economists Gösta
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complement to government full-employment policies.114 As such, this
complementarity deserves much more study and discussion than can be offered in
this Article.
III. LABOR LAW AND UNION STRUCTURES
How do rules of labor law relate to structures of bargaining? Are particular
features of American labor law causes or consequences of highly decentralized
bargaining in the United States? As this Part will argue, it is not difficult to find,
perhaps unsurprisingly, several homologies between the structure of American
collective bargaining and particular provisions of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA). A much more challenging issue is attempting to parse out cause and effect.
I do not claim to arrive at any final conclusions, but as the inquiry will reveal, my
tentative conclusions suggest that provisions of the NLRA have more often been
products of the bargaining structures they govern, rather than the reverse. Even if
this is the case, one could also ask whether the law reacts back upon bargaining
structures in a constraining way. In response, the following analysis will suggest that
the law’s recursive role is not overwhelmingly determinative either. These
conclusions, though tentative, are mostly good news because the implication is that
currently existing labor law probably does not place that many constraints on efforts
to reform the nature of union and bargaining organization.
A. Exclusive Representation, Union Security, and Employer Domination
Critical to the functioning of both labor law and the American model of labor
unions is the general principle of exclusive representation,115 as well as the more
specific permission of union security agreements (in non-“right-to-work” states)116
and the prohibition against employer domination of labor organizations.117 All of
these provisions have roughly the same effect, namely to maximize union power
within firms and, consequently, to concentrate that power at a more decentralized
level.118 The result is a union structure that is weaker both at industry and national
levels as well as overall, since it is less able to make fundamental changes in the labor
market.119

Rehn and Rudolf Meidner, the architects of what is now called the “Rehn-Meidner model” of economic
policy).
114. See ROBERT POLLIN, BACK TO FULL EMPLOYMENT 154–55 (2012) (explaining that full
employment and effective unions, as complimentary means for achieving rising working- and middleclass living standards, can play a central role in managing inflationary pressures in an economy
committed to full employment).
115. Clyde W. Summers, Exclusive Representation: A Comparative Inquiry into a “Unique” American
Principle, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 47, 47 (1998). Exclusive representation is established statutorily
in section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2012).
116. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
117. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2).
118. See infra notes 120, 130, 133 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 120, 130, 133 and accompanying text.
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The principle of exclusive representation is set forth in section 9(a) of the
NLRA.120 That section declares that unions “designated or selected” by a majority
of employees in an “appropriate” bargaining unit “shall be the exclusive
representatives of all employees” for the purposes of collective bargaining.121 Union
security refers to an agreement the union makes with an employer wherein the
employer promises to retain in employment only those employees who are members
of the union.122 In essence, this means that all workers in a bargaining unit must
financially support the labor union.123 Although section 8(a)(3) prohibits employers
from discriminating among employees on the basis of their membership (or
nonmembership) in a union, that section contains a proviso that allows an employer
to agree to a union security clause.124 Finally, section 8(a)(2) prohibits employers
from dominating or interfering with the formation or administration of a labor
organization or contributing financial or other support to it.125
Exclusive representation—essentially unique to the Wagner model of labor
law126—grants the labor union a representational monopoly. In origin, exclusive
representation had a dual purpose: “to minimize conflicts between rival labor
organizations and to prevent employers from fostering company unions and playing
off one group of employees against another.”127 Rival labor conflicts are only
possible where several (decentralized) unions are competing over narrow
jurisdictional boundaries.128 Further, minimizing the role of employers in the
representation of workers’ interests is plainly derived from the philosophy of job
control, which seeks to limit and contain the employer’s control over the allocation
of technology and the organization of work.129 Exclusive representation is thus a
fundamental component of decentralized job-control unionism.
Similarly, union security is also directly related to the objectives of job-control
unionism. As was seen, the closed shop was fundamental, even the “crowning

120. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
121. Id.
122. Many versions of union security exist. A closed shop requires an employer to hire and
maintain in employment only union members. A union shop allows an employer to hire any employee,
regardless of union affiliation, but requires the new hire to become a union member within a certain
period of time, such as thirty days, as a condition of employment. Finally, an agency shop is similar to
the union shop, except that it only requires employees to make financial contributions to the union,
rather than full, formal membership. See Matthew Dimick, Labor Law, New Governance, and the Ghent
System, 90 N.C. L. REV. 319, 350 & n.160 (2012).
123. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (permitting union security agreements as long as they only require
employees to “tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of
acquiring or retaining membership”).
124. Id.
125. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2).
126. Bok, supra note 110, at 1397.
127. Id. at 1426.
128. See Donald R. Colvin, Comment, Jurisdictional Disputes, 20 WASH. L. REV. & ST. B. J. 217,
217–18 (1945).
129. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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achievement” of craft unionism in its purest form.130 Similarly, the union shop
served basically identical objectives.131 A higher proportion of members in a
bargaining unit essentially means more power for the union.132 Union membership
implies exposure of the worker to the union’s viewpoint and worldview. And even
if this does not increase support for the union, dues paid even by dissenting
members still constitute resources the union can use to strengthen its position. With
this power, the union is better able to control the flow of work and jobs within the
enterprise.
Finally, the prohibition on employer domination likewise fits extraordinarily
well with a form of unionization and collective bargaining that seeks to influence
the basic contours of the organization of work through job control and exclusive
representation. Senator Wagner, the architect of the NLRA, often argued that an
employer dominated or influenced organization could not adequately represent
workers’ interests.133 Furthermore, the constraints that section 8(a)(2) place on
potentially collaborative relationships between unions and employers are by now
well recognized.134 Thus, along with exclusive representation and union security, the
company-union ban comports nicely with the union philosophy of job control.
By comparison, the contrast to Europe could not be more striking. Exclusive
representation is virtually unknown.135 As a formal legal matter, the prevailing rule
appears to be proportional representation.136 Nominally, unions only bargain for
their members, although in practice employers nearly always extend the agreement’s
terms to all employees.137 Nevertheless, a complementary legal rule also appears to
prevail, which makes it illegal for union agreements to apply exclusively to union
members.138 In addition, in several countries, the closed shop and other union
130. See Streeck, Skills and Politics, supra note 4, at 319.
131. Id.
132. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
133. Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace
Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1445 (1993).
134. See Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the “Company Union” Prohibition: The Case for
Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 125 (1994).
135. Virtually, because although Clyde Summers originally identified exclusive representation
as a “unique” principle of labor law, see Clyde W. Summers, Exclusive Representation By The Majority Union:
A Unique Principle of American Law, in HEDENDAAGS ARBEIDSRECHT 304 (1965) (Festschrift honoring
Professor Marius G. Levenbach), he later argued that lack of competition between unions for members
and certain legal procedures to designate “most favored” unions acted as functional equivalents for
exclusive representation, see Summers, supra note 115.
136. For example, in Germany, “[b]y its terms, the [collective] agreement does not cover
employees who are not members of the union.” See BLANPAIN ET AL., supra note 41, at 585.
137. Again, in Germany, “[u]sually, the employer will, nevertheless, apply the terms of the
agreement to all employees, even those who are not members of the union.” Id.
138. Id. (explaining that the German Federal Labor Court has held that German labor law
“includes a so-called negative freedom of association, so that provisions such as ‘closed shop
agreements, shop agency agreements and even agreements which are intended to reserve advantages
exclusively for trade union members’ are forbidden”). Swedish labor courts have arrived at a similar
rule. See RONNIE EKLUND ET AL., SWEDISH LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 27, 70–82 (2008).

2014]

PRODUCTIVE UNIONISM

705

security devices are prohibited.139 Even in the countries where union security
agreements were historically not formally prohibited,140 unions agreed to an open
shop clause.141 Currently, under European law, all of the European Union is “right
to work.”142 Clearly, the result of the combination of all of these rules’ results in a
kind of legally-supported—not just permitted—free-rider dilemma for unions. Yet,
I would suggest that the effect also weakens unions’ representational monopoly at
the local level and hence undermines any incipient job-control tendencies. Finally,
as the discussion of works councils above made clear, employer domination at the
workplace level is much more extensive in Europe than in the United States in
unionized contexts.143
How important are exclusive representation, union security, and the employerdomination prohibition for the maintenance of a decentralized collective bargaining
regime in the United States? Each factor probably plays some role in sustaining such
a regime, but it seems unlikely that their removal alone would dramatically change
the structure of unions and collective bargaining. For many years Great Britain had
no legal procedures for government certification of labor unions, including the
absence of any provision for exclusive representation.144 Yet Britain has retained a
relatively decentralized collective bargaining structure.145 A similar story could be
told for union security. For example, even in American states that prohibit union
security agreements, the difference between workers covered by a collective
agreement and union membership is not terribly large.146 Even unionized
workplaces in right-to-work states have impressive firm-level union density.147 Finally,
139. See, e.g., EKLUND ET AL., supra note 138, at 70–82.
140. In 2006, the European Court of Human Rights declared that union-security agreements
were incompatible with the principle of freedom of association under the European Convention. See
Sørensen & Rasmussen v. Denmark, 2006-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 3, 27–28 ¶ 65, 29–30, 30 ¶ 76–77, 32 (2006).
Thus, in countries where union security had been absent because unions had agreed voluntarily to the
open shop, European law prohibits union security.
141. Dimick, supra note 122, at 355 (noting that the union agreement to a general ban on the
closed shop has existed in Sweden since 1906).
142. See Sørensen & Rasmussen, 2006-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 27–28 ¶ 65, 29–30, 30 ¶ 76–77, 32
(referencing the right not to join a trade union per Article 11 of Europe’s Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms).
143. See supra notes 45–51 and accompanying text.
144. See OTTO KAHN-FREUND, LABOUR AND THE LAW 166 (2d ed. 1977); see also CHRIS
HOWELL, TRADE UNIONS AND THE STATE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
INSTITUTIONS IN BRITAIN, 1890–2000, at 84 (2005).
145. There has been a notable level of decentralization in Britain during the last few decades,
starting from a comparatively low level of centralization, and labor law reform more recently has moved
closer to the Wagner model. See HOWELL, supra note 144, at 128. But this appears more like a case of
law following collective bargaining organization than the reverse.
146. The Bureau of Labor Statistics provides data on both union membership and the number
of workers represented by a union. For instance, in Alabama, a right to work state, in 2012 the
percentage of workers represented by a union was 10.5% while union density was 9.2%—not
unimpressive in a state that does not permit union security agreements. News Release, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members—2013 ( Jan. 23, 2013), available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf.
147. Certainly union security matters for other union objectives. Unions defend union security
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the prohibition of employer-domination of unions likewise may have a marginal
effect on the structure of unions and bargaining, but it seems very unlikely that its
absence alone would produce any notable change. Thus, the historical structure and
organization of collective bargaining probably explains more about American labor
law than the reverse.
B. Representation Elections and Bargaining Units
Other procedures ordained by the NLRA, in particular representation
elections and the creation of “appropriate” units of bargaining, also influence the
structure of union organization and collective bargaining. To become the certified
bargaining representative, section 9(c)(1) requires that a union prevail with a
majority of the votes in a NLRB-supervised “election by secret ballot,” which the
Board will direct after the filing of a petition (typically by the union) and a finding
that a “question of representation exists.”148 Directing an election also requires
finding an appropriate bargaining unit.149 The statute gives little guidance for what
constitutes “appropriateness,” but a healthy body of Board case law has developed
to address this issue.150 In this inquiry, the principal concern in evaluating a
proposed bargaining unit is whether the employees share a “community of
interest.”151
This first important point to make is the way these two inquiries interact. For
some time, the Board has tended to express a preference for smaller bargaining
units. Nominally, the justification for this is that “the smaller unit assures greater
homogeneity of employee interest and maximizes employee self-determination.”152
Formally, the Board is not tasked with encouraging unionization, but rather with
giving full freedom to workers’ preferences over unionization.153 Clearly, however,
a policy that assures greater homogeneity of employee interests is likely one that will
encourage greater unionization.154 Whatever the rationale, however, the
with great intensity and right-to-work legislation probably makes unionization more difficult. But these
are separate questions from how union security affects the degree of union centralization.
148. National Labor Relations Act § 9(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (2012).
149. Id.
150. 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT 641 ( John E. Higgins, Jr. et al. eds., 5th ed. 2006).
151. Blue Man Vegas, LLC v. NLRB, 529 F.3d 417, 421 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“The Board’s
principal concern in evaluating a proposed bargaining unit is whether the employees share a ‘community
of interest.’”).
152. ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 234 (15th ed. 2011).
153. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules of Union
Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655, 656 (2010) (“Federal labor law aims to ensure that employees have
a choice on the question of unionization.”).
154. Henry S. Farber, Union Success in Representation Elections: Why Does Unit Size Matter?, 54
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 329, 330 (2001) (“[I ]t has always been the case that unions have been less
likely to win NLRB-supervised representation elections in large units than in small units . . . .”). For an
interesting historical analysis of internal Board policy change that supports this view, see JAMES A.
GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE: THE SUBVERSION OF U.S. LABOR RELATIONS POLICY, 1947–1994, at
171–72 (1995), explaining that in 1962, in the decision of Sav-On Drugs, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1962),
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consequence is the same: small bargaining units and greater decentralization.155
Notice as well the consequence of forms of worker representation. As we saw, the
greater heterogeneity of interests represented by European industrial unions does
not mean that these unions have necessarily been less successful at representing
their members.156 On the one hand, they have been forced to find and advocate for
broader, more universal definitions and policies of worker interests.157 On the other
hand, alternative forms of workplace representation, such as works councils, have
developed to fill the representation gap left by broad industry-level bargaining.158
The Board’s bargaining unit determinations also more directly impact the
question of bargaining structure. This can be observed in the Board’s policy toward
multiemployer bargaining units. Unlike other bargaining units, units covering more
than one employer must be established consensually.159 Accordingly, the Board itself
may not direct an initial union representative in a multiemployer unit.160 If
employers are likely to agree to bargain on a multiemployer basis only if all relevant
employers agree to do so, then this policy essentially gives a single employer veto
power over the whole multiemployer unit. In effect then, the policy discourages
multiemployer bargaining.
As with exclusive representation, union security, and the employerdomination prohibition, representation elections are unknown in Europe and, even
more narrowly, appear only in countries such as the United States, Canada, and to
a lesser extent the United Kingdom as features of the American and peculiar
Wagner model of labor law.161 Given the analysis of bargaining structure and
employer opposition in Part II.C, it is not surprising that where union recognition
would be a particularly contentious issue, legal procedures would be adopted to
referee this issue. It is interesting to note that the creation of a statutory method of
recognition in the United Kingdom came after a period of further decentralization
of collective bargaining.162
As in the case of exclusive representation and union security, I suggest that it
is unlikely that representation elections and bargaining-unit determinations exercise
a strong sway over the structure of bargaining. True, the Board’s influence over

“the Board overturned a long-standing rule that the appropriate unit for collective bargaining in retail
chain store operations should include employees of all stores within an employer’s administrative
division or geographic area” and that “the old rule, by requiring very large units, had impeded
employees’ statutory right to self-organization.”
155. Id.
156. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
159. 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 150, at 715–16.
160. COX ET AL., supra note 152, at 253.
161. See BLANPAIN ET AL., supra note 41, at 240–41 (describing union recognition procedures
in Canada). The United Kingdom has only had statutory recognition procedures, including the
possibility of a secret ballot, since 2000; consequently, most recognition occurs voluntarily—ninetyfour percent—which was the traditional method of recognition before labor law reforms. Id. at 517–18.
162. HOWELL, supra note 144, at 86–130.
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bargaining-unit determinations is quite extensive and the implications are
significant, as the history of policy conflict in this area indicates.163 But this role
seems small if it is the case that having any form of government supervised
recognition elections and bargaining-unit determinations is closely correlated with
decentralized bargaining structures. Furthermore, one can again point to the case of
the United Kingdom, which for many years had no recognition procedures or
government-ordained unit determinations, and yet has had relatively decentralized
collective bargaining.164
C. Subjects of Bargaining
Since the structure of bargaining influences the subjects of bargaining, an
investigation into the legal doctrines governing this area provides some illuminating
insight into the nature of American unionism. This area is one that has always been
fraught with legal difficulty.165 First, and on the one hand, the Act is clear in
imposing a duty to bargain on both union and employer.166 However, as courts have
held, almost from the outset, this duty does not compel any party to concede to any
particular term.167 Rather, parties only have an obligation to meet and confer and
bargain in “good faith” over terms and conditions of work.168 Second, the duty to
bargain applies only to wages, hours, and other conditions of employment.169 From
this language of the Act, labor law has developed the distinction between
“mandatory” and “permissive” subjects: mandatory referring to those subjects that
parties must consider and over which they have a legal right to bargain to impasse,
and permissive referring to those subjects that may be discussed but that no party
may insist be considered.170

163. See GROSS, supra note 154.
164. See supra notes 144–45, and accompanying text. The relatively recent adoption of formal
recognition procedures only reinforces the argument, since they followed, rather than preceded, even
further decentralization of collective bargaining in the United Kingdom. See supra note 162 and
accompanying text.
165. See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 150, at 820 (“The reciprocal duty of an
employer and the representative of its employees to bargain ‘in good faith’ is among the most unruly
of the obligations imposed by the [NLRA].”).
166. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2012); id. § 158(b)(3), (d).
167. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45–46 (1937) (explaining that the
NLRA does not compel agreement and only encourages a free opportunity for negotiation to bring
about adjustments and agreements); see also 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 150, at 823
(describing history and legislative intent that the NLRA does not compel parties to reach an agreement).
168. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (defining the duty to bargain as “the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith”).
169. Id. (stating that the duty to bargain applies “with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment”); see also id. § 159(a) (stating that collective bargaining applies “in respect
to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment”).
170. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349–50 (1958) (endorsing
the Board’s distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining); see also Wooster Div.
of Borg-Warner Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1292 (1955); 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note
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Much American legal commentary has been captivated by the way important
Supreme Court decisions have (seemingly) arbitrarily narrowed the range of
mandatory subjects by importing “values and assumptions” outside the text of the
NLRA.171 In particular, James Atleson declares that judicial interpretations of the
duty to bargain represent one of the “stronger and clearer” ways the U.S. Supreme
Court has imported into the NLRA “the almost-never-stated goal of protecting
inherent managerial prerogatives from collective bargaining.”172 A leading case in this
area is Fibreboard Paper Products v. NLRB.173 The Supreme Court held in Fibreboard
that the employer was obligated to bargain about its decision to subcontract work
to an independent firm, as well as about the effects of such a decision on
employees.174 The underlying reasoning of the decision emphasized the absence of
capital investment and the lack of impact on the employer’s right to manage the
company.175 Thus, although the Court concluded that the employer did have a duty
to bargain over the issue of subcontracting, subsequent legal scholarship has
emphasized how the language of capital investment and managerial rights has
limited the scope of the Act.176
Yet, rather than seeing these decisions as narrowing the range of mandatory
subjects, the truly startling finding is just how broad this range is comparatively
speaking. Sweden and the other Nordic countries, where union density tends to be
highest among developed countries, provide surprising contrasts to American
assumptions about managerial rights and the duty to bargain.177 Section 38 of
Sweden’s Joint Regulation Act specifically addresses subcontracting, and with
significant exceptions, obligates employers to negotiate with the union about
decisions to contract out work.178 First, it should be noted that the Act’s use of the

150, at 829–32 (describing the development of the distinctions between mandatory, permissive, and
illegal subjects of bargaining).
171. See generally JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW
(1983) (arguing that courts have imported employer-friendly doctrines inapposite to the intent and
purpose of federal labor statutes); James Gray Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and
Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 518 (2004) (discussing how the Supreme Court used nineteenth-century
doctrinal discourse to present, in strong and clear terms, five core values regarding American labor
law—including continuity of production, employee control, imposition of a “limited status” on
employees in the management of the enterprise, management ownership of the common enterprise,
and limitation of rights for management—which predate the statute and have remained substantially
unaltered in statutory and common law).
172. ATLESON, supra note 171, at 114.
173. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
174. Id. at 210–17.
175. Id. at 213.
176. ATLESON, supra note 171, at 124–35 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s decision for
emphasizing factors extraneous to the text of the NLRA such as managerial decisions that “lie at the
core of entrepreneurial control”).
177. Dimick, supra note 122, at 332–35 (comparing rates of union membership, or union
densities, across countries, and showing the union density is highest in the Nordic countries of
Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden).
178. In Sweden, under section 4 of the 1936 Act on the Right to Organise and Negotiate, both
unions and employers are under a general duty to negotiate. See EKLUND ET AL., supra note 138, at 118–
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term “negotiation” is more aptly described as “consultation.”179 A duty to consult
obligates the employer to inform the union and gives the union a right to be heard,
but is otherwise notably weaker than a good-faith duty to bargain.180 Nevertheless,
section 39 of the same Act also permits the union to veto any employer decision
that “violate[s] the law or the collective agreement applicable to the work or that
such action would otherwise contravene generally accepted practices.”181 In
European practice, a veto right sits somewhere between mere consultation rights
and a good faith duty to bargain.182 But what is particularly interesting is what this
veto right may not be used for: section 40 says that the veto is not applicable if the
union lacks a reasonable basis for its position and specifically that the veto may not
be exercised “to reserve the job opportunities—when the work in question will be
performed by members of another union—to the union’s own members.”183
Thus, to put the contrast most sharply, in the United States, unions have a
right to bargain with employers over subcontracting decisions only when they affect
their members, while Swedish unions have a (weaker) right to veto, and only when
subcontracting decisions do not affect their members. In essence, the veto is a
mechanism to prevent the employer from evading its legal (e.g., tax and social
security fees) and already agreed-upon contractual obligations, not a means of
advancing particular union members’ interests.184 In other words, the veto protects
general labor market standards, not particular workers’ jobs. This contrast in legal
responses to subcontracting captures very nicely the fundamentally different nature
of collective bargaining in decentralized and centralized regimes. Few better

26. However, the Swedish duty is substantially weaker than in U.S. labor law. The duty requires little
more than the appearance at negotiations and the signing of an agreement, if one is reached, and thus
does not even contain a good faith requirement as in the United States. Id. Section 11 of the Joint
Regulation Act also imposes on employers subject to an existing collective agreement a duty to bargain
with the union about decisions “regarding significant changes in work or employment conditions.” Id.
at 205 (quoting § 11 LAG OM MEDBESTAMMANDE I ARBETSLIVET (Svensk författningssamling
[SFS] 1976:580) (Swed.)). This duty arguably encompasses a broader range of mandatory subjects than
does American labor law. See generally Timothy A. Canova, Monologue or Dialogue in Management Decisions:
A Comparison of Mandatory Bargaining Duties in the United States and Sweden, 12 COMP. LAB. L.J. 257 (1991)
(comparing American and Swedish labor laws involving the duty of employers and unions to negotiate
over decisions affecting working life). However, the Joint Regulation Act’s use of the term “negotiation”
is more aptly described as “consultation,” which imposes a significantly weaker duty than a good faith
bargaining requirement. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
179. EKLUND ET AL., supra note 138, at 205 (writing that the Swedish Joint Regulation Act
“uses the term ‘negotiation’ with regard to a procedure that more aptly can be termed ‘consultation’”).
180. See BLANPAIN ET AL., supra note 41, at 661 (contrasting “consultation” rights in the French
case with “codetermination,” or bargaining, rights in the German case).
181. EKLUND ET AL., supra note 138, at 239.
182. See BLANPAIN ET AL., supra note 41, at 661 (situating “approval and veto” rights between
rights of consultation and rights of codetermination in the case of German works councils).
183. EKLUND ET AL., supra note 138, at 240.
184. Id. at 239 (citing the Swedish Minister of Labor’s remarks on the objectives of the veto
right, which include preventing an employer’s “[e]vasion of collective agreements and legislation [e.g.,
tax and social security fees]” by contracting out work).
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examples of the differences between job-control and industrial-political unionism,
and their reflection in law, could be found.
One could conjecture that the legally imposed limits on mandatory subjects of
bargaining could have an effect of discouraging union decentralization. For instance,
if carving out the “core of entrepreneurial control”185 from the domain of
mandatory subjects makes it more difficult for unions to advance a particularistic
job-control agenda, then one could think that American unions would be forced in
response, like their European counterparts, to develop broader and more universal
goals and collective action repertoires.
Yet, not least for the reasons just given, my belief is that the law governing
mandatory and permissive subjects has had very little such effect.186 First, as I have
argued, in comparative perspective the range of mandatory subjects appears, if
anything, broader than in other countries. The state of the law thus gives unions
ample room to pursue job-protective strategies. Second, it is extremely unclear
where the line between mandatory and permissive subjects lies.187 As long as the
union is able to press its case, the law’s uncertainty can only fail to limit the unions’
bargaining demands.188 Third, besides being conceptually hard to distinguish, the
difference between mandatory and permissive subjects is relatively easy to evade in
practice. Since nothing prohibits consensual bargaining over permissive subjects,
there is always scope for unions to negotiate over such subjects by conceding on a
mandatory term over which the union has a right to bargain to impasse. Finally,
even where the law has limited the duty to bargain over matters of managerial
concern, it has never questioned the duty to bargain over the effects of these
managerial decisions.189 Since effects bargaining surely produces costs, the
difference between bargaining over the exercise of a managerial right (permissive)
and bargaining over the effects of its exercise (mandatory) creates yet another
elusive distinction from the employer’s economic point of view.
D. Restrictions on Economic Action
Finally, this section will consider the relationship between limitations on the
ability to strike and the structure of collective bargaining. Several different labor
laws governing strikes are relevant to bargaining structure. Perhaps most directly

185. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 213 (1964).
186. This view is supported elsewhere. See ATLESON, supra note 171, at 115–16 (arguing, despite
his critique of the judicial limitations on mandatory subjects, that “heretical though it may be for a law
professor to assert, . . . these basic rules do not necessarily affect bargaining”).
187. Id. at 120 (describing the mandatory/permissive distinction as “inherently vague,” and that
because “no guidelines exist to determine where the mandatory/permissive line should be drawn[,] . . .
[t]his should lead to the most serious objection to the dichotomy”).
188. Id. at 115 (“For instance, a relatively strong union or employer may find some way to get
the other side to discuss a permissive term.”).
189. First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681 (1981) (“There is no dispute that the
union must be given a significant opportunity to bargain about these matters of job security as part of
the ‘effects’ bargaining mandated by § 8(a)(5).”).
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relevant is section 8(b)(4)(A) of the NLRA, which prohibits the use of concerted
work stoppages where the objective is “forcing or requiring any employer or selfemployed person to join any labor or employer organization.”190 Although added
as part of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA,191 this prohibition is
consistent with other parts of the Act and its interpretation. “The Board has always
held that multiemployer bargaining is consensual on both sides of the bargaining
table” and an attempt to coerce the other side into multiemployer bargaining
violates the duty to bargain under sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3).192 In any case, these
rules would appear to limit the ability of unions to use strikes to goad employers
into broader, industry-wide bargaining structures.
Other restrictions on unions’ economic action have also been argued to limit
a broader, more universalistic unionism. Infamously, the Taft-Hartley Act, in
addition to section 8(b)(4)(A)’s prohibition, banned secondary activities.193
Secondary activity is the use of economic pressure against an employer with whom
the union does not have a dispute in order to compel that employer to cease doing
business with another employer with whom the union does have a dispute.194 Since
secondary activities require a certain level of coordination across employers, it is
easy to draw the conclusion that their ban also inhibits the emergence of more
coordinated unions and bargaining. For instance, in his legal history of the
formation of the American labor movement, William Forbath sees pre-Wagner Act
prohibitions of secondary and sympathetic strike actions as part of a broader set of
legal constraints that contributed to the formation of a narrow, bread-and-butter or
“business” union movement in the United States.195
How significant have these prohibitions been for arresting the growth of more
coordinated or centralized unions and collective bargaining? In this case, the
conclusion I draw is more ambiguous than in the other areas of labor law. First, the
Taft-Hartley prohibitions that directly prohibit strikes for the object of compelling
an employer to join a multiemployer unit are easily evaded. However, while one can
question Forbath’s class-based interpretation of the secondary boycott, it may

190. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (2012).
191. Id.
192. Douglas L. Leslie, Multiemployer Bargaining Rules, 75 VA. L. REV. 241, 242 (1989).
193. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)(B).
194. The Taft-Hartley-amended NLRA makes the prohibition in as general terms as possible.
The language prohibits concerted work stoppages where the object is “forcing or requiring any person
to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other
producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person.” Id.
195. WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT
1–8 (Harvard Univ. Press 1991) (1989). Forbath argues that nineteenth-century labor law played a
pivotal role in shaping the labor movements strategic and ideological thinking and producing a narrow,
“pure and simple” business unionism that was “job conscious” rather than “class conscious.” Id. One
example was the use of the “labor injunction,” which was used primarily to enjoin secondary boycotts,
sympathy strikes, and organizing activities. Id. at 59–60. For Forbath, boycotts in particular were
significant because “they mobilized whole working-class populations—broad networks of workers (and
their families) not linked to individual workplaces or particular unions.” Id. at 83.
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nevertheless play an indirect role in encouraging employers to bargain with unions
on an industry-wide basis.
The direct prohibition of strikes with multiemployer bargaining objectives is
easily evaded because unions can resort to other legal tactics to encourage employers
to bargain on an industry-wide basis. For example, consider “whipsaw” strikes.196
A whipsaw strike is a strike where a union selectively and successively strikes against
only certain employers in the same product market.197 Because only one employer
is struck while its competitors are still operating, this poses far more damage to the
struck employer than if the union had struck all employers simultaneously.198
Obviously, such tactics place unions in a position of greater advantage vis-à-vis
employers. By the same token, such tactics also encourage employers to respond
collectively: multiemployer lockouts are a common response tactic to the whipsaw
strike.199 More importantly, employers are better off bargaining on a multiemployer
basis rather than allowing themselves to be targeted, one after the other, by the
union.200 Thus, as long as unions do not demand that employers join a
multiemployer bargaining association, whipsaw strikes are an effective way to
encourage employers to do so without violating the express provisions of the Act.
The connection between whipsaw strikes and industry bargaining is not just
an American story. In Sweden, broad, industry-wide—and later multi-industry
wide—centralized bargaining began in the engineering (machinist) industry, where
employers resorted to the multiemployer “sympathy” lockout for identical reasons
as in the United States.201 Specifically, unions’ “cheap pressure-point tactics could
be extraordinarily effective in whipsawing employers, picking them off one at a time
(lönesaxning).”202 By whipsawing employers, a large union treasury “could
comfortably fund a small number of strikes indefinitely.”203 In response, a
multiemployer lockout could trigger “a quick and massive bloodletting of union
strike funds,”204 in addition to the other benefits cited above. Multiemployer
lockouts grew into multi-industry lockouts as employers strove to hammer unions
196. In any discussion of multiemployer bargaining, the issue of “whipsaw” strikes is likely to
follow, suggesting that multiemployer bargaining is primarily an employer response to such union
tactics. To take just one example, in one of the central Supreme Court cases dealing with multiemployer
bargaining rules, the use of a whipsaw strike figured prominently. See Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 410, 423–24 (1982).
197. Leslie, supra note 192, at 242 & n.14.
198. Id.
199. Id.; NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 94, 97 (1957) (finding that
a multiemployer lockout in response to a whipsaw strike does not violate the National Labor Relations
Act).
200. COX ET AL., supra note 152, at 252 (“Many employers believe that they have greater
bargaining power when they can face a potential strike as a group, unlike when the union bargains with
competing companies one at a time threatening each with a strike while the others are filling the needs
of their customers.”).
201. See SWENSON, supra note 26, at 71–82.
202. Id. at 74.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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into submission.205 In fact, multiemployer lockouts were so effective that employers
“opposed anti-union legislation in 1911 on the grounds that restricting unions’
ability to use boycotts, blockades, and sympathetic strikes, which also hit innocent
third parties, would undermine the legitimacy of lockouts.”206 For all that, on the
unions’ side, it appears that “sympathy strikes were fairly rare and unimportant” in
Sweden.207 Surprisingly, it was employer collective action, more than employee
collective action, that led to centralized bargaining in Sweden.208
All of this raises questions about the place of secondary boycotts in building
more coordinated union organizations and collective bargaining. Given what we
have said before, unions’ most effective tactic is not to extend the strike to multiple
fronts and employers, but rather to concentrate economic pressure on a single
employer at a time, and (for once) let market competition work for the unions.
Certainly, a simultaneous strike action against multiple employers could serve
important, expressive (rather than instrumental) objectives. But these goals can be
accomplished with general, political, or sympathy strikes, which, unlike the

205. Id. at 80–82. It is interesting to note what employers were able to achieve with their
coordinated lockout tactics. In 1905, the Swedish Engineering Employers’ Association and the Swedish
Metal Workers’ Union concluded the “first industry-wide multi-employer wage settlement for any
industry in the country.” Id. at 78. Included in that agreement was the union’s promise of “no
restrictions on managerial rights regarding the introduction and manning of machinery or hiring of
unskilled workers and apprentices.” Id. at 79. In addition, the union agreed to the open shop, “thereby
eliminating any residual possibility of imposing restrictive work rules by controlling the supply of labor.”
Id. In short, job-control unionism was eliminated. One year later, the Swedish Employers’
Confederation imposed on unions, as well as member employers, the terms of the “December
Compromise.” Id. at 80–81. The famous “paragraph 23” of that agreement prohibited closed-shop
agreements and union control over managerial decisions involving hiring, firing, and supervising work.
Id. at 81. Paragraph 23 also required the inclusion of “an iron-clad managerial rights clause” in every
collective agreement. Id.
206. Id. at 75.
207. Id. at 81.
208. This conclusion raises the question: Why have American employer responses been so
different from those of Swedish employers? Although clearly some employers have responded
collectively to coordinated “whipsaw” strikes in order to discipline rather than destroy them, the
dominant employer response in the United States, both historically as well as today, has been to bust
or break unions. Indeed, Swenson characterizes the employer response in the United States as one of
“strikebreaking,” which was “especially suited to destroying” unions; in Sweden, employers’ goal was
“to tame unions, not destroy them.” Id. at 82. To explain the difference, Swenson points to differences
in firm size, rates of enterprise formation, country size, and immigration and emigration patterns. Id.
But one could also highlight differences in internal union organization. Indeed, when in 1900 American
employers associated with the National Metal Trade Association attempted to make a multiemployer
agreement with the International Association of Machinists in what is now called the “Murray Hill”
Agreement, the bargain was undermined by a national union strike over a disagreement on wage
increases. Id. at 53. In response, employers declared war on the unions. As Swenson writes, employers
“slammed the door shut for all time [on centralized bargaining], because union militants used the strikes
to impose the closed shop . . . and rules prohibiting men from operating more than one machine at a
time, working for piece rates, and instructing unskilled workers.” Id. The national Machinists’ leadership
appeared incapable, even fearful, of containing local militancy. Id. at 53–54. This is consistent with weak
internal union centralization. See infra Part IV.A and accompanying text.
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secondary boycott ban, are not prohibited outright.209 Instead, secondary boycotts
are likely effective because they are a means of bringing yet additional economic
pressure on a single employer establishment, albeit through a secondary employer.210
Given this conclusion, it is possible to see the secondary boycott as playing a
complicated, dual role. On the one hand, given their single-firm focus, the
secondary boycott is entirely consistent with a relatively decentralized form of union
organization, one that seeks to extract the maximum share of rents from single
employers or establishments.211 On the other hand, inasmuch as unions use the
boycott in a whipsaw like fashion, against successive employers in the industry, it
could be a strategy of further encouraging employers to bargain on a multiemployer
basis. The important question, I would argue, is how unions respond to employers’
collective, multiemployer response. Do unions accept full industry-level bargaining,
with all important terms set at the level above individual firms? Or do unions
continue to attempt a whipsaw strategy, seeking to extract maximum rents from
individual firms, and coordinating across firms only to achieve such firm-level
gains?212 Unions’ short-term interests may indeed be the latter, but if this choice
undermines employers’ commitment to true industry-level bargaining, employers’
only available response may be to seek to destroy the union.213
In conclusion, the direct ban of strikes with the objective of establishing a
multiemployer bargaining unit is easily evaded by a whipsaw strategy, which

209. The more pressing legal problem that sympathy actions typically confront is the existence
of a no-strike clause in the relevant collective bargaining agreement.
210. Several years ago, Derek Bok reached a similar conclusion: a secondary boycott can only
be used in a dispute that is capable “of being confined to a single firm, or a few firms at most, for it is
generally impossible to blockade an entire industry.” See Bok, supra note 110, at 1442.
211. Bok also argues that secondary boycotts are associated with more decentralized forms of
collective bargaining:
Moreover, a boycott becomes necessary only if the employer can defeat a strike by hiring
replacements or by managing in some other fashion to keep his plant in operation. Thus, in
countries were economic strikes are generally conducted on a multi-employer basis, the
boycott is not only impractical, it is also unnecessary, for associations of employers will never
be able to attract enough qualified replacements to fill their collective needs . . . .
Id. at 1442–43. Note that once employers have committed to a multiemployer lockout strategy, the best
response of unions is to preempt such a move by launching a multiemployer strike, rather than
continuing with a whipsaw strategy. Even though more financially costly, it gives the union a strategic
advantage by putting the union in the first-mover position. However, this requires a sufficiently
coordinated and centralized union organization. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
212. One should therefore not simply distinguish between decentralized and centralized
bargaining, or envision a simple monotonic relationship between them, but distinguish a third,
intermediate form of collective bargaining, what one might call “coordinated” bargaining. This strategy
seeks to maximize employee gains at each firm, using cross-firm coordination only to strengthen
bargaining at the local level. For an interesting and formal examination of such a threefold typology of
bargaining structures, see Justus Haucap & Christian Wey, Unionisation Structures and Innovation Incentives,
114 ECON. J. C149 (2004) (defining differences between decentralized, coordinated, and centralized
wage bargaining and finding that coordinated bargaining creates the worst incentives for firm
innovation compared to the less centralized (decentralized) and more centralized (centralized)
bargaining regimes).
213. See supra note 26.
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encourages employers to bargain on a multiemployer basis. In comparison, the
secondary boycott has conflicting effects on more centralized bargaining. On the
one hand, if used in a coordinated fashion, it can also create incentives for
employers to move toward industry-wide bargaining. On the other hand, if unions
continue to use the boycott to extract gains from specific firms, this will undermine
employer support for industry bargaining. In this case, secondary boycotts will
contribute to greater decentralization in bargaining even as it requires greater union
coordination across different firms.
IV. PRODUCTIVE UNIONISM
What can be learned from this discussion that can be applied to reimagining
the future of labor unions and labor law? I hope readers take away two fundamental
points: first, bargaining structures matter tremendously, and second, the need for
fundamental labor law reform may be less crucially important to reorganizing
bargaining structures than might be supposed. Taken together, these two points
mean that unions ought to concentrate more on reexamining their own practices
and structures of organization and less on an attempt to revive a now outdated and
possibly harmful legal regime of collective bargaining.
In many ways, trying to shift toward a more centralized structure of bargaining
may seem at best a medium-term and perhaps more likely a long-term objective of
labor movement revitalization.214 At around six percent density in the private
sector,215 unions must have someone to bargain for before they can talk about how
to bargain. Nevertheless, thinking about how collective bargaining ought to be
conducted, even if this seems a distant possibility, does have some important
implications for how unions can organize, win objectives for workers, and grow
their organizations in the here and now. As will be discussed in this Part, unions
should reorganize their own internal organizations, seek to bargain on a broader,
but “members only” or proportional basis, and reduce the scope of their collective
bargaining agenda. As already implicated in the previous Part, I argue more
extensively below that labor law reform is a less crucial objective, but I highlight
areas of labor law that are most likely implicated by a shift in bargaining and
organizational structure.

214. Margaret Levi, Organizing Power: The Prospects for an American Labor Movement, 1 PERSP. ON
POL. 45, 47 (2003). Levi’s approach, also informed by a comparative perspective, largely confirms the
analysis made here. She writes that a “comparative perspective on labor unions reveals that the best of
all worlds for the workers—and, as it turns out, for the economy—is coordinated [i.e., centralized]
bargaining at the national level and significant rank-and-file engagement at the local level.” Id. However,
she also adds, “But the achievement of national and coordinated bargaining is an unrealistic goal in the
foreseeable future in the United States. What American labor can do, however, is to become once again
a social movement.” Id. On the issue of engagement at the local level, see infra notes 228–29 and
accompanying text.
215. See News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 146, at 1.
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A. Reorganizing Unions: The Link Between Union
Organization and Bargaining Structure
One of the most important things unions can do to position themselves to
change the structure of bargaining is to change their own internal organizational
structures. Up until now, this Article has overlooked the distinction between the
structure of internal union organization and the structure of collective bargaining.
Both can be described as more or less centralized, but the distinction between them
is important. Centralization of union organization refers to the location of decisionmaking authority within the organization. For example, where within the union are
decisions made for such fundamental tasks as political representation, collective
bargaining, and decisions to undertake strikes or other economic actions? In more
centralized unions, these decisions rest at a higher level: at the federation rather than
at the national affiliate, or at the national affiliate rather than the local union
organization. By bargaining centralization is meant the level at which collective
bargaining between unions and employers takes place.216 Beginning at the least
centralized level, does collective bargaining take place at the workplace, the firm,
the industry, the sector, or even across sectors and industries?
To illustrate the distinction between union and bargaining centralization,
collective bargaining could, for example, take place at an industry level between an
industry union and a counterpart employer association. But local affiliates of the
union confederation could still retain the authority—spelled out in the industry
union’s constitution—to strike, to engage in political representation, or to
collectively bargain on their members’ behalf without permission or fear of sanction
from the confederation. This would be a case of bargaining centralization being
greater than union centralization.
As Figure 3 illustrates, union centralization and bargaining centralization tend
to correlate very highly. As can be observed in that graph, the higher the
centralization of authority within the umbrella of union organizations, the higher
the level at which collective bargaining takes place. In this graph, the “Union
Authority” measure includes several different indicia of authority, such as, for
example, a national union’s control over finances (vis-à-vis a local union), strike
funds, appointment of workplace representatives, and its veto power over a local
union’s decision to strike or make a company-level agreement. The index also
captures the level of union authority at both federation and national affiliate level.
On the other axis, the “Bargaining Level” measure refers to the level at which
bargaining takes place (local, industry, or nation) and whether lower level
supplementary bargaining is permitted in the latter two cases.

216.

Wallerstein, supra note 101, at 655.
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within their own affiliates. But organizational change is part of the essential history
of the American labor movement. Change to Win, the Congress of Industrial
Organizations, the Knights of Labor, the Industrial Workers of the World, and even
the American Federation of Labor itself all represent the responsiveness of
American unions to organizational change. Some of these reorganizations were
successful, some were not, but all have left their mark. Union reorganization could
come from within existing union structures, or it could come through an entirely
new founding. But certainly there is no reason why a fundamental change in union
organization should not be possible. Moreover, consider the alternatives: Labor
unions may not be able to control the outcome of proposed legislation in Congress
or dictate the behavior of employers, but union organization is one thing unions
should be able to control for themselves.
B. Proportional Representation: Breadth, Not Depth
Currently, labor unions in the United States attempt to grow by organizing all
workers at a given employer or workplace, an achievement formalized through the
recognition of the union as the exclusive bargaining representative, either through
a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) representation election or a card-check
recognition agreement.218 Instead, I propose that unions seek to represent a “critical
mass” of workers on a “members only,” or proportional, basis and actively avoid
exclusive representation and the NLRB certification process. Importantly however,
unions should pursue this objective simultaneously across many different employers
and workplaces. More controversially, this strategy may also imply a rejection of
union security in any of its current manifestations. In short, unions’ approach
should be one of favoring representational breadth over depth.
The advantage of this approach is that it will reduce the excessive formalities,
the high stakes, and the limited all-or-nothing menu of collective bargaining options
that plague and generate obstacles at too many points along the current
representation process. The greater resources required for cross employer
organizing will be balanced against the resource savings of fighting a costly and
drawn out battle for Board certification and exclusive representation.
A common concern raised about members only bargaining is that it generates
a level of workplace organization that is too weak to generate the kind of collective
bargaining gains to which unions are historically accustomed.219 However, seeking
membership depth before breadth may be a self-defeating strategy. Union success
is ultimately about power, the ability of unions to be able to impose their demands
on employers. But critically important, and almost completely unrecognized, is the
issue of how union power ought to be allocated. Consider the argument of the
Dutch economists Teulings and Hartog.220 While unions in centralized bargaining

218.
219.
220.

Pope, supra note 171, at 544–50.
TEULINGS & HARTOG, supra note 30, at 21.
Id.
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will cooperate with employers and seek to maximize the joint surplus between them,
“[u]nions in decentralized economies aim for maximizing the share of their
members, not the joint surplus.”221 Furthermore,
To be able to pursue this strategy they have to be strong in the firms for
which they negotiate a collective agreement. Being strong requires a high
membership within these firms. The easiest and most visible way to gain
high membership is to pursue the share-maximizing strategy for their
members. But because of this strategy, employers in non-unionized firms
will have maximum incentives to avoid being unionized. Union
membership will be highly dichotomous: close to 100 per cent in unionized
firms, zero everywhere else. In decentralized labour markets we see a
distinction between a union sector and a non-union sector, with employers
trying to hold the line; in corporatist [i.e., more centralized] labour markets,
unions are spread out all over the labour market and employers do not
fight unionization.222
As this preceding example illustrates, the issue of power and membership
resources is much more complicated than the simple distinction between “weak”
American unions and “strong” European unions would imply. Labor union
advocates would do well to think more deeply about how power is allocated within
the labor movement. This may imply seeking to avoid the temptations presented by
exclusive representation, union security, and a myopic opposition to employerinfluenced forms of workplace representation. These may help unions enhance their
power at the local level, but produce greater employer opposition and a weaker labor
movement in the aggregate. The paper presented in this conference by Fisk and
Sachs proposes members-only bargaining as a kind of second best adaptation to the
reality of right-to-work legislation.223 But my argument carries this implication much
further: perhaps the labor movement should fundamentally reexamine its
unwavering devotion to union security. Labor unions remain implacably opposed
to right-to-work legislation.224 Yet Europe is quite literally a right-to-work
continent.225 Which union movement is doing better?
It is worth noting that the American labor movement is already taking steps
to organize in this way, if more by force of circumstance than by conscious design.
The current efforts to organize both fast-food and Wal-Mart workers are
distinguished by their broader, multiemployer or at least multiestablishment
221. Id. “Maximizing the share of their members” would include, but go beyond the kind of
“job control” benefits this Article has described.
222. Id.
223. Catherine L. Fisk & Benjamin I. Sachs, Restoring Equity in Right to Work Law, 4 U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. 857, 858–59 (2014).
224. See Monica Davey, Limits on Unions Pass in Michigan, Once a Mainstay, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
2012, at A1 (quoting Craig Becker, general counsel of the A.F.L.-C.I.O., saying “you can’t be in favor
of collective bargaining and what collective bargaining represents for ordinary people . . . and still
support right-to-work legislation”).
225. See Sørensen & Rasmussen v. Denmark, 2006-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 3, 27–28 ¶ 65, 29–30, 30 ¶
76–77, 32 (2006).
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strategy, a rejection of the NLRB certification process, as well as a willingness to
make wage or other workplace demands before the establishment of an exclusive
bargaining representative. It is precisely this kind of organizing strategy that will
develop into broader, more inclusive bargaining, provided that local demands and
interests are subsumed to the central organizations of unions and employers.
C. Two-Tier, or Bifurcated, Bargaining: Less is More
As we have already seen, decentralized collective bargaining creates incentives
for unions and workers to attempt to address every aspect of the workplace. Instead,
unions should dramatically scale back the extent of their demands. They should
focus on core issues, such as wages, and collaborate, possibly with employers, on
“political” solutions to health care, job security and unemployment insurance,
pensions, and job training and workforce development.
This strategy is recommended, not only because incentives will be better
aligned, but because it can also reduce the high stakes that the present Wagner
regime raises for unions and employers. Reducing the stakes should make union
organizing easier. As it stands now, employers expect the full array of job control,
share-maximizing unionism to follow the certification of a union in an NLRBsupervised election. For all the reasons outlined above, this gives employers
maximum incentive to oppose unionization. An all-out employer campaign in turn
requires maximum dedication, loyalty, and solidarity from employees if the
unionization drive has any hope of succeeding. By demanding less from employers,
unions can reduce employer opposition and increase the rate of unionization.
Many questions could be raised at this point. Does not this proposal leave
unaddressed some important workplace concerns of employees? What about the
role of unions in giving workers a “voice” on the job? Even setting aside the classic
aim of workplace, or industrial, democracy, does a highly centralized labor
movement that focuses distantly on a small range of worker issues create its own
grave democratic deficit?226
My response to this is that these tasks are best left to alternative and distinct
workplace institutions, such as works councils or employee representation
committees, established consensually by unions and employers or by enabling
legislation.227 These “dual” forms of representation can perform two functions.
First, they provide a way to address workers’ interests and concerns at the local
level. Second, this bifurcated mode of worker representation can also address the
democratic deficit that may be created by greater centralization in collective
226. The issue of “union democracy” is an extremely important and contentious subject within
labor movement circles. See Matthew Dimick, Revitalizing Union Democracy: Labor Law, Bureaucracy, and
Workplace Association, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 1–4 (2010).
227. The idea of works councils being established in the United States is not an impossibility.
Volkswagen and the United Auto Workers are in talks about establishing a works council at the
company’s assembly plant in Chattanooga, Tennessee. See Jack Ewing & Bill Vlasic, VW Plant Opens
Door to Union and Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2013, at B1.
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bargaining. Workplace representation, whether union or nonunion, can be an
important point of access of unions to the workplace. Workplace forms of
representation that are closer to workers’ daily and individual concerns give workers
a collective organization with which to stay engaged with the labor movement.
Developing dual forms of representation can therefore also provide a kind of
democracy-enhancing form of “secondary association.”
However, even more than this, centralized union structures are very likely an
important precondition for these “dual” forms of worker representation to be
meaningful and effective. To understand this assertion, consider the analysis of
works councils by Freeman and Lazear.228 As their analysis illustrates, the
establishment of a works council is a perfect example of a two-sided holdup
problem mentioned above. On the one hand, given their intimacy to the process of
production, workers have information and ideas that can be used to increase the
productivity of the workplace.229 A works council can be a way of transferring this
information to management and of generating new ideas and information through
its collaborative structure. However, while workers stand to benefit from any gains
in productivity in the workplace, they do not have any particular guarantee that they
will share in any of these rewards. More than that, information about how workplace
productivity could be increased could come at the expense of particular workers
and jobs. Employers face a similar dilemma. The employer will also stand to gain
from productivity improvements, but any organization of workers gives them a
certain measure of power and control in the workplace, however informal, which
could be used to extract rents from the employer. Thus, both employers and
workers have something to gain and to lose from the institution of a works council.
Given these strategic dilemmas, the stability of works councils is highly fragile.
Once again, industry-level collective bargaining can help solve these firm-level
works council holdup problems. Industry bargaining takes the wage-setting process
out of the individual firm, and thus helps assure the employer that a works council
will not be used to extract rents from the firm. Likewise, the forms of employment
security that exist at the labor-market level provide a form of insurance to workers
who lose from workplace changes elicited by works councils.
D. Labor Law Reform?
This Article’s analysis has several implications for the question of labor law
reform. In particular, it can help address two separate questions. First, and more
specifically, should labor law be reformed to encourage greater bargaining
centralization? Second, and more generally, what role should labor law reform play
in revitalizing the labor movement?

228. Richard B. Freeman & Edward P. Lazear, An Economic Analysis of Works Councils, in WORKS
COUNCILS, supra note 45, at 27.
229. Id. at 44–48.
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The implication for the first question follows fairly straightforwardly from the
analysis of the relationship between labor law and structures of collective bargaining
provided in Part III. The major conclusion drawn there is that, while certain features
of the NLRA complement the more decentralized bargaining in the United States,
it seems unlikely that labor law causes decentralized bargaining. Rather, Part III
suggested that the reverse is more likely true: that the law is a consequence of the
prevailing structures of American collective bargaining. If this conclusion is correct,
then at the very least it is unlikely that labor law reform could encourage greater
centralization of bargaining by removing the particular labor law rules mentioned in
that Part.
What of the more general issue of the role of labor law reform in revitalizing
labor unions? The common refrain one hears within labor movement circles is that
labor law reform is essential to any future for labor unions. In the more familiar
explanation, employer opposition is the chief culprit in the decline of unions in the
United States.230 In turn, high levels of employer opposition are traced to weak and
underenforced labor laws.231 Yet, as this Article has contended, strident employer
opposition to unionization is at least also, if not mainly, a product of a decentralized
bargaining structure. This Article would therefore sound two notes of caution
before committing to labor law reform as a top priority. First, if labor law reform
does not fully address the underlying sources of employer opposition rooted in the
structure of collective bargaining, then such reforms will be treating the symptom
rather than the disease. Second, another danger is that labor law reform will end up
reinforcing the old, decentralized model of collective bargaining, setting the labor
movement up for future backlash and decline. My conclusion then is that even if
labor law reform is desirable, in some form and measure, it should perhaps not be
the focus of union revitalization efforts.
CONCLUSION
Labor unions face a paradox. While the rate of union membership has
decreased in the United States for the past several decades, income inequality
continues to grow and has now reached discomforting levels. Thus, although union
membership is in decline, labor unions are more necessary and relevant now than
at any time in the past several decades. How can unions confront this decline and
meet the challenge of rising income inequality? This Article has paid close attention
to the issue of collective bargaining structure and in particular to the level of
centralization in collective bargaining. Bargaining structure varies greatly across
countries, and this variation has much to do with the extent of industrialization and
the legal and constitutional structures that prevailed at the time the labor movement

230. See Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1769–74 (1983); see also PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE:
THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 118 (1990).
231. WEILER, supra note 230, at 121–28, 241–45.
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in each country was founded. In addition, the level of bargaining centralization has
important implications for issues of economic productivity in the workplace. For
the reasons described in this Article, decentralized bargaining tends to worsen
productivity, while more centralized bargaining can enhance it. Most critically, it is
these effects on productivity that largely dictate employer responses to unionization,
and this can explain why employer opposition to unions is higher in countries with
decentralized bargaining while less in countries with more centralized bargaining.
Because of its central role in explaining employer attitudes toward unionization,
labor-movement activists must consider bargaining structure in any proposal for
union revitalization. Finally, even if changing the structure of bargaining is a
medium- or even long-term goal, thinking in terms of these goals does have
distinctive consequences for how unions should be organizing workers in the here
and now.

